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Three Essays on the Economics of Health in Developing Countries
Patrick Opoku Asuming
This dissertation consists of three chapters that address health issues in developing coun-
tries. The first two chapters study Ghana’s social health insurance program, the National
Health Insurance Scheme. Many developing countries have recently instituted social health
insurance schemes (SHIs) to ease financial barriers to utilization of healthcare services and
help mitigate the effects of adverse health shocks. Although these SHIs offer generous terms
and benefits, enrollment remains low especially among the poorest households who are the
intended primary beneficiaries. The first two chapters are based on randomized field in-
terventions implemented in the Wa West district of the Upper West Region of Ghana to
(a) understand the reasons for low enrollment in SHIs; (b) estimate the effects of insur-
ance coverage on utilization of healthcare services, financial protection and health outcomes,
and c) learn about how resource-constrained households allocate health resources among its
members. The interventions were increased convenience of signing for insurance, an edu-
cation intervention that provided information about the insurance program, and a subsidy
intervention that included varying levels of subsidies for insurance premiums.
The first chapter deals with objectives (a) and (b). The results show that inadequate
information about the insurance program, and insurance premium and fees affect enroll-
ment. The results also show that the demand for insurance is price elastic in the sense that
small subsidies generate substantial enrollment effects. Insurance coverage leads to increased
utilization of healthcare services, reduced out-of-pocket payments among individuals with
prior positive expenses and ,moderate improvement in health outcomes. The results suggest
strong complementarities between providing information and providing subsidies in utiliza-
tion and health outcomes, an indication of the importance of the combined interventions for
achieving changes in health-seeking behavior and outcomes.
The second chapter focuses on objective (c): intra-household allocation of health re-
sources among resource-constrained households. The analysis in this chapter is based on
households who were assigned to receive subsidies only and the pure control group. Two
types of vouchers were issued to households who did not receive full subsidies: one that
allowed households to decide how to allocate subsidy among its members and one in which
they had no control over the allocation. This chapter compares within household enrollment
patterns across these two vouchers. The results suggest that households prioritize children in
the presence of resource constraints. Among children, households who were allowed to deter-
mine allocation of subsidy amounts enroll 11.7 percentage or 18% more boys than girls. The
results suggest that these patterns of allocation cannot be explained by baseline health con-
ditions or expected health. The chater presents supporting evidence that differential labor
market participation is a likely explanation for the differential allocation by gender among
children: among children aged 7-17 years, labor market participation is 3.6 percentage points
higher for boys than girls.
The third and final chapter is coauthored with Ayaga A. Bawah and James F. Phillips.
The chapter seeks to explore how the quasi-experimental introduction of reproductive and
family planning services affects the fertility behavior of different socio-economic groups in
a rural African setting. We combine a quasi-experimental introduction of reproductive and
family planning services in the Kassena-Nankana districts in the Upper East Region of Ghana
with longitudinal data from the Navrongo Health and Demographic Surveillance System to
quantify the differential fertility effects of the interventions by socio-economic status (as
measured by woman’s education status, her husband’s education status and wealth). We
track the fertility behavior and outcomes of more than 24,000 women in their reproductive
age (15-49) over a period of eighteen years. Our results show that before the interventions
educated women did not have significantly fewer children, but desired lower family sizes and
were more likely to use modern contraceptives. However, husband’s education was associated
with lower fertility especially when their wives were also educated. Wealth was associated
with higher fertility, reflecting a higher child survival rate in wealthy families. Moreover,
controlling for wealth does not affect the effect of education on fertility. We find that the
reproductive health interventions affected both educated and uneducated women but the
effect on educated women was stronger, leading to the emergence of an education-fertility
differential 16 years after the introduction of the interventions. Our results suggest that in
settings where men dominate reproductive decision-making, their education status may have
a stronger effect on fertility than the educational attainment of women.
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1Chapter 1
Getting the Poor to Enroll in Health
Insurance and Its Effects on Their
Health: Evidence from a Field
Experiment in Ghana
21.1 Introduction
Health shocks have non-trivial negative effects on the financial conditions of uninsured poor
households and their ability to smoothen consumption (Townsend, 1994; Deaton, 1997;
Gertler and Gruber, 2002; Wagstaff, 2007). Yet many poor households in developing coun-
tries lack access to mechanisms for pooling risks and suffer health-related poverty in the wake
of adverse health shocks. In the absence of insurance, a high fraction of medical expenses
are borne by households in the form of out-of-pocket payments, and financial constraints are
significant barriers to access to healthcare in many low-income countries (Xu et al, 2003).1
With encouragement from international organizations and donor governments, many de-
veloping countries have recently instituted social health insurance schemes (SHIs) to remove
financial barriers to healthcare and help mitigate the impact of adverse health shocks (WHO,
2005; WHO, 2010).2 Moreover, countries with existing insurance programs for formal sector
workers have recently extended them to the informal sector.3 However, in spite of the rel-
atively low cost of signing up and the generous benefits offered by SHIs, take-up rates are
very low in many countries especially among the poorest households (Acharya, et al forth-
coming). Low take-up of government programs is not peculiar to health insurance programs
1
For instance, according to WHO (see http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs320.pdf) 11.3% of all
medical expenses in Germany are borne by households while in the Democratic Republic of the Congo about
90% of the money spent on healthcare is paid directly by households to providers.
2
Recent examples include Georgia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania and Vietnam. Countries in the process
of instituting SHIs include Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia and South Africa.
3
Examples include Colombia’s Regimen Subsidiado, Mexico’s Seguro Popular, Phillipine’s National Health
Insurance Program and Nicaragua’s Insitituto Nicaraguense de Securidad Social (INSS)
3in low-income countries; it is pervasive across programs and countries.4 It is a concern for
policy-makers because it undermines their purpose of promoting equity and redistributing
income. This concern is exaggerated in the case of health insurance programs due to the
potential for adverse selection and its welfare implications. Yet, in spite of the growing
literature evaluating SHIs, little attention has been paid to the issue of low take-up.
An important related issue is whether enrollment in SHIs provides adequate financial
protection, increases utilization of healthcare services and, ultimately, improves health out-
comes. An extensive empirical literature in the US, both experimental and non-experimental,
has shown that insurance coverage reduces out-of-pocket payments and increases utilization
of healthcare services while evidence on the impact on health outcomes is mixed (Newhouse
et al 1993; Currie and Gruber, 1996; Card et al, 2008; Finkelstein and McKnight, 2008;
Card et al 2009; Michalopoulos et al, 2011; Finkelstein et al, 2012). However, the structure
of the health insurance market in the US differs in important ways from those of developing
countries. First, supply-side constraints, in the form of availability and quality of health
facilities and personnel, are more binding in developing countries. Second, a high fraction of
the population in the US obtain health insurance from private markets. By contrast, with
limited or non-existent private health insurance markets, SHIs in low-income countries tend
to be single-payer country-wide government-run insurance schemes. A growing empirical
literature has evaluated the effects of SHIs on utilization and out-of-pocket payments (See
Acharya et al, forthcoming, for a review of this literature). However, many of these studies
fail to adequately address concerns about selection in the take-up of insurance and their
estimates may be biased. King et al (2009) and Thornton et al (2010) are exceptions.
4A large empirical literature from developed countries, especially the United States, has highlighted the
role of non-financial factors in low take-up of government programs for the poor (Moffitt, 1983; Currie and
Grogger, 2001; Bitler et al, 2003; Remler and Glied, 2003; Hernanz et al, 2004; Bansak and Raphael, 2006;
Currie, 2006; Kleven and Kopczuk, 2011). Studies from developing countries emphasize both financial and
non-financial factors (Clert, 2000; Coady and Parker, 2009; Amior et al; 2012).
4This chapter seeks answers to three broad questions. First, what accounts for the low
enrollment in SHIs? To what extent do the levels of premiums, incomplete information and
remoteness from enrollment locations contribute to low enrollment? Second, how do resource-
constrained households allocate health resources among its members? Third, does enrollment
in SHIs improves access to healthcare services, provides financial protection against out-of-
pocket expenses and improves health outcomes?
To understand low enrollment in insurance, I introduced randomized interventions in a
poor, rural and agrarian district in northern Ghana to encourage take-up of a nationwide
health insurance scheme. I then used the resulting random variation in insurance cover-
age to estimate the effects of enrollment on utilization of healthcare services, probability of
making out-of-pocket expenses and health outcomes. The interventions are a convenience
intervention, an education campaign and a subsidy intervention. The convenience inter-
vention sought to increase the convenience of enrolling in insurance by allowing individuals
in randomly selected communities to sign up in their community instead of traveling over
18km (mostly by foot) to the district capital. The education intervention assesses the role of
incomplete information on enrollment by providing information on registration procedures,
premiums and exemptions, and benefits of the insurance scheme. For the subsidy inter-
vention, households in randomly selected communities were randomly assigned to receive
amounts equivalent to 1/3, 2/3 or the full financial cost of signing up for insurance. I use
the resulting variation in the price of insurance to estimate the price elasticity of demand.
My experimental set-up was designed to test for possible complementarities among the
interventions. An important ongoing debate in development policy is focused on the proper
design of multiple interventions. Although it is frequently presumed that an integrated ap-
proach of multiple anti-poverty interventions has stronger effects5, there is limited empirical
5 PROGRESA and the Millennium Villages Project (MVP) are recent examples. Pronyk et al (2012)
discusses the logic behind the approach of the MVP.
5demonstration of the presumed complementarities that underlie this approach. I test for
possible complementarities by stratifying my interventions and including a complete set of
interactions.
Seven months after the introduction of the interventions, I find that providing additional
convenience of signing up has no effect on take-up but the price of insurance (premium and
fees) and information are significant determinants. My estimates suggest that the demand
for insurance is price elastic. Providing a moderate amount of subsidy has strong effect on
enrollment. For instance, a 33% subsidy on premiums and fees doubles enrollment. There is
no evidence of complementarities among the interventions in terms of take-up. However, I
find evidence of adverse selection: individuals from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and in
poorer health respond more to the interventions, especially the education intervention, and
are also more likely to take up the 1/3 subsidy.
Insurance coverage has strong effect on utilization of healthcare. My two-stage least
square local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates suggest that insurance coverage
increases utilization by 120% to 211%, which is consistent with the evidence on adverse
selection on health. I also find evidence that insurance coverage improves health outcomes.
For instance, insurance coverage reduces the number of days of illness by 0.339 days (or 42%)
and the number of days an individual is unable to perform normal daily activities by 0.805
days (or 52%). I also find improvement in self-reported health outcomes.
More importantly, my reduced-form estimates imply strong complementarities between
the education and subsidy interventions in utilization of healthcare and health outcomes.
This is an important finding in the light of the absence of complementarities in the first-
stage estimation. It suggests that to the extent that policy makers care about utilization
of services and health outcomes but not take-up of insurance in itself, policy should com-
6bine price interventions with education. It is also a significant finding because it informs
the ongoing policy debate about the proper design of multiple development interventions
mentioned earlier. Although previous studies have provided macro-level evidence on policy
complementarities (De Macedo and Martins, 2008; Chang et al, 2009), my chapter is among
the first to demonstrate complementarity in a convincing way at the micro-level.
In terms of financial protection, only a small fraction of individuals make positive out-
of-pocket (OOP) health expenditure (12.6% of individuals at baseline) in my setting. Un-
surprisingly, I find no effect of insurance coverage on the likelihood of a positive OOP for
my full sample. However, for individuals with positive baseline expenditures, I find that
insurance coverage leads to a 2.7 percentage point reduction in the probability of making
such expenditures at the follow-up. These results are consistent with findings from previous
studies that use nationally representative data from Ghana.
My chapter contributes to a large empirical literature on health insurance. It is one of very
few studies that provide experimental evidence on health insurance in low-income countries.
King et al (2009), Thornton et al (2010) and Barofsky (2011) are the closest of the existing
work to my chapter. My contribution to this literature is two-fold. Firstly, to my knowledge,
my chapter is the first to use multiple randomized interventions to understand enrollment
decisions of vulnerable rural populations. Thorton et al (2010) also implement multiple
interventions to study enrollment in Nicaragua but they focus on an urban population and
they do not test for possible complementarities nor examine the effect of insurance on health
outcomes. Secondly, my chapter is the first to provide experimental evidence on the effect of
enrollment in a nation-wide government-run health insurance scheme. Although King et al
(2009) and Barofsky (2011) also examine the effect of Mexico’s nationwide Seguro Popular
(SP) on utilization, health spending and health outcomes, SP was implemented along with
other health interventions which makes it difficult to isolate the effect of health insurance
from the other interventions.
7My chapter also contributes to a growing body of work explaining low take-up of public
programs. Within this strand, it is more closely related to the empirical literature on the
role of pricing in take-up and use of health products and services in developing countries.6
My results are consistent with previous studies that find that price is a strong driver od
demand for insurance and other health products and services (Kremer and Miguel, 2007;
Dupas, 2009; Cohen and Dupas, 2010; Karlan et al, 2012; Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2012;
Cole et al, 2013). My chapter differs from existing studies in its focus on health insurance.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2 documents the institutional
context by providing details of the NHIS; section 3 describes the research design and data
collection; section 4 describes the empirical framework; section 5 presents the main results
and section 6 concludes the chapter.
1.2 Institutional Background
1.2.1 Historical Context
At independence in 1957, Ghana established a tax-financed publicly provided health care
system with no payment for services at point of use. Healthcare personnel were trained and
paid by the government which also provided supplies for health facilities. In the early post-
independence era, the Ghanaian economy, boosted by high international prices for its main
exports, especially cocoa, was able to support this health financing arrangement. From the
late 1960s, however, as world prices of Ghana’s main exports commodities began to tumble
and the economy began to deteriorate sharply, it became increasingly difficult to sustain
publicly provided “free” healthcare. Health facilities began experiencing acute shortage of
6Holla and Kremer (2009) reviews the recent evidence of the effect of price on access to education and
health services from randomized evaluations.
8essential medical supplies and equipments and quality of health services deteriorated.
Major health care reforms were introduced in 1985, as part of a broader Structural
Adjustment Program. These reforms led to the introduction of user fees at public health
facilities in the form of co-payment for health services (Ramachandra & Hsiao, 2007). By
1992, this arrangement had evolved into a system of full cost recovery, infamously known
as the “cash and carry” system. The sector was also liberalized to allow private sector
participation in the provision of healthcare (Gajate-Girrado & Ahiadeke, 2012).
The cash and carry system was found to have accentuated inequities in financial access to
healthcare and deprived the poor of access to basic and essential services (Waddington and
Enyimayew, 1990). As widespread discontent over this financing arrangement grew, pressure
mounted on political leaders to replace it with a different health financing system. In re-
sponse, and with encouragement of the Ministry of Health, a number of community-initiated
mutual health insurance schemes began to emerge in 1990s. These schemes clustered around
major health facilities and required members to pay periodic premiums in order to enjoy the
benefits offered. While these schemes partially bridged the gap in social protection between
the formal sector which benefits from the national social security system, and the impover-
ished informal sector, most members could not afford the very low premiums (Ramachandra
& Hsiao, 2007). Nevertheless, the community-based initiatives became an important foun-
dation for the introduction of the National Health Insurance Scheme.
1.2.2 Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme
The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was established by the National Health
Insurance Act (Act 560) in 2003. The scheme became fully operational in 2005. It aims
to improve access to and the quality of basic healthcare services for all citizens, especially
9the poor and vulnerable, through the establishment of an affordable healthcare financing
arrangement (MOH, 2004).
Act 560 provides for the establishment of three types of insurance schemes: District
Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (DMHISs), Private Mutual Health Insurance Schemes
(PMHISs) and Private Commercial Insurance Schemes (PCHISs). The DMHISs are publicly-
run and subsidized by the government through the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF).7
It accounts for more than 96% of insurance coverage (GSS, GHS and ICF, 2009) and is the
focus of this study. The law mandates that every citizen enroll in at least one scheme although
in practice obtaining insurance is voluntary as no penalties are prescribed for those who do
not enroll. Almost all of the 170 administrative districts of Ghana operate its own DMHIS.
They are run as semi-independent corporate bodies under the control of the National Health
Insurance Authority (NHIA), the regulator. Individuals enroll in their district of residence
but membership is readily transferable from one district to another. DMHISs accept and
process applications, collect premiums (and fees), provide membership identification cards
and process claims from accredited facilities for reimbursement. Premiums collected by
DMHISs are transferred to the NHIF from which claim reimbursements are made.8
Act 560 provides for means-tested premiums to be charged to informal sector workers,
ranging from GH¢7.20 ($5) to GH¢48 ($32) annually. However, due to the lack of infor-
mation on household incomes, this has proved difficult to enforce. In practice, poor rural
districts tend to charge the lowest premiums while the urban districts charge higher premi-
ums. Premiums can be adjusted upwards after approval by the NHIA. Indigents, children
7PMHIS are non-profit non-subsidized schemes run by NGOs, religious bodies and cooperative societies.
Most schemes under this catergory existed before the passage of Act 560 but were previously unregulated.
PCHISs are for profit schemes that do not receive government subsidies.
8Informal sector premiums contribute 5% of total funding for the NHIS (NHIA, 2010). The other sources
of funds to the NHIF are a 2.5% VAT levy on selected goods and services (61.49%), retention of 2.5% of
formal sector workers’s salaries (16.87%), sectoral budgetary allocation (4.76%) and donor support.
10
under 18 years of age and the elderly (aged 70 years and above) are exempt from premiums.9
Beginning from July 2008, pregnant women also enjoy premium exemption status under
the Free Maternal Care program. All members (except indigents and pregnant women) are
required to pay a registration fee at first registration and subsequent renewal. To put the
annual premiums in context, annual per capita income estimated from latest Ghana Living
Standards Survey was 400 cedis or $433 in 2006 (GSS, 2008).
There is a minimum waiting premium period of three months before new members become
eligible for benefits. Existing members who do not renew their membership at the due date
are liable to pay a penalty when they eventually renew their membership.
The benefits package of the NHIS, which is specified by a legislative instrument and is
the same across DMHISs, is very generous. Table A8 summarizes included and excluded
services. Broadly, it covers i) full outpatient and inpatient (surgery and medical) treatments
and services; ii) full payment for medications on the approved list; iii) payments for referrals
on the approved list and iv) all emergencies. The NHIA estimates that 95% of disease
conditions that affect Ghanaians are covered by the scheme. Excluded services include
aesthetic treatments, assisted reproduction, appliances and prostheses, anti-retroviral drugs
for HIV/AIDS, cancer treatment other than breast and cervical cancer, cosmetic surgeries,
brain and heart surgery, organ transplant and all treatments obtained outside Ghana.
In spite of the low premiums and generous benefits, enrollment in the NHIS remains
low. By the end of 2010, the total active membership stood at 34% of the population
of Ghana (NHIA, 2011). Enrollment is particularly low among the poorest quintile. A
2008 nationwide survey found that 29% of the individuals in the lowest wealth quintile were
9The law defines an indigent as “a person who has no visible or adequate means of income or who has
nobody to support him or her and by the means test qualifies as an indigent”. Regulation 58 of LI 1809
provides more concrete criteria. An indigent is a person who satisfy all of these criteria i) unemployed and
has no visible source of income, ii) does not have a fixed place of residence according to standards determined
by the scheme iii) does not live with a person who is employed and who has fixed place of residence iv) does
not have any identifiably consistent support from another person
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active members of the scheme compared to 64% of households in the highest quintile (NDPC,
2009). Membership is also lower among individuals with no education, those employed in
the informal sector and those who reside in rural areas.
1.2.3 Setting
The study was conducted in the Wa West district in the north-western part of Ghana. Wa
West is a poor and remote rural district located in the Savanna High Plains. It covers
an area of approximately 5,899.3 square kilometers and had population of about 81,000 in
2010. The district is inhabited mainly by the Dagaaba, Brefo, Lobi and Wala ethnic groups.
Settlements patterns are highly dispersed with majority of residents living in hamlets of
about 100-200 people.10 This, coupled with poor road network, makes traveling within the
district difficult and expensive.
The economy is largely agrarian. Over 90% of the labor force are subsistence farmers
who grow food crops such as maize, sorghum and vegetables. The district is classified as
one of the most deprived districts in Ghana and is located in the poorest region of Ghana,
the Upper Region. Latest estimates of household incomes from the Ghana Living Standard
Survey (GLSS V) in 2006 indicates that per capita income for a person living in a rural
savannah locality, like Wa West, was GH¢232 or $252.8011 (GSS, 2008). The annual per
capita health expenditure was GH¢24 cedis or $26.
Besides income poverty, the district also has a high basic infrastructure deficit. It is
one of few districts yet to be connected to the national electricity grid. Only the district
capital and the health centres have access to electricity powered by solar energy. The district
10See: http://www.ghanadistricts.com/districts/?r=9& =115&sa=3249
11At 2006 exchange rate: $1=GH¢0.92
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has no tertiary health facility and only 6 public health centres. However, following recent
reforms in Ghana Health System 13 Community-Based Health Planning and Services (CHPS)
facilities have been placed in areas farther away from health centers, leading to a fairly even
distribution of health facilities and a significant reduction in the distance to primary health
care services.1213 All these facilities are accredited to provide care under the NHIS. As at
June 2010, the district had no medical doctor but 15 professional nurses (Nang-Beifua, 2010).
The district has a high disease burden. The most common cause of out-patient (OPD)
visits in the region is malaria (a third of all OPD visits), which has a reported prevalence
of 16.5 (as of 2004).14 Other common causes of OPD visits are acute respiratory-tract
infections, skin diseases and snakebites. Trachoma (an infectious blindness-causing disease)
and guinea worm are endemic in the district.
The Wa West Mutual Health Insurance Scheme became operational in January 2007.
Although the Upper West Region has the highest active membership rate in the NHIS of
53% (NHIA, 2011), Wa West has one of the lowest enrollment rates in Ghana. The baseline
enrollment rate for the study sample is 21%. At the start of the project the Wa West DMIHS
charged a uniform premium of GH¢8.20 ($5.46) for adults (18-69) and processing fee was
GH¢4 for first-time members and GHC1 for renewals. Late renewals attract a fee of GHC2
in addition to full premiums for all years for which membership was not renewed.15
12CHPS (Community-Based Health and Planning Services) facilities are located within rural communities
with limited access to larger hospitals and manned by regular and community health nurses to provide
primary health care services. Among the services are treatment of common ailments (malaria and diarrheal
diseases) and maternal and child care services.
13Seventy-five percent (75%) of communities in the study sample are within 6 km (3.73 miles) of a health
facility.
14http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/Prm.html




The study introduced three interventions: a subsidy towards the payment of NHIS premium
and fees, an education campaign and a convenience intervention as well as a complete set of
their interactions (see Figure 1a). All interventions were randomized at the community level.
The convenience intervention sought to reduce the cost of signing up for NHIS resulting from
remoteness from the district capital where the DMHIS office is located by allowing residents
of selected communities to sign up in their own community.16 For this intervention, an
official from the Wa West DMHIS, accompanied by a fieldworker visited randomly selected
communities to register or renew membership of community members. There were two visits
seven days apart, each lasting from 9am to 5pm, and on different days of the week. Each
visit was pre-arranged with community leaders who were informed that the exercise was
strictly for members of that community.
The goal of the education intervention was to assess the impact of lack of or incomplete
information about the NHIS on enrollment. This intervention provided basic information
on the NHIS including registration information, premiums and exemptions, and benefits
of the scheme as well as general education on the importance of being insured. As with
the convenience intervention, trained fieldworkers visited randomly selected communities to
provide information/education and answer questions about the scheme. It also involved two
visits, each from 9 am to 5pm, seven days apart and on different days of the week.
The subsidy intervention gave households in randomly selected communities subsidies to
16
To deal with the problem of remoteness, the Wa West DMHIS has an “agent system” in place. Under this
system, community leaders from strategic locations are appointed as “local informants” for the scheme to
collate registration and renewal forms for onward transmission to the scheme. The convenience intervention
is therefore a test of the additional convenience on top of this existing arrangement.
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defray all or part of the cost of enrolling in the NHIS. The level of subsidy received was ran-
domized at the household level. Households in subsidy communities were assigned to receive
a full subsidy (GH¢12.20 or $8.13), subsidy worth 2/3 (GH¢8.10 or $5.40) or 1/3 (GH¢4 or
$2.67) of insurance premiums and fees (See Figure 1b). In all cases, children (aged less than
18 years) and the elderly (aged 70 years or more) received full subsidies for registration fees
so the variation in subsidy level applies to adult household members. Subsidies were given in
the form of vouchers with a two-month validity period and redeemable only at the Wa West
DMHIS. The voucher specified names, ages and gender of all household members, expiration
date and where it should be redeemed. Figure 1.3 presents an illustrative example.
Vouchers were issued irrespective of the individual’s enrollment status so that currently
enrolled individuals could use the vouchers only if their membership expired within the two-
month validity period. To aid the redemption of vouchers, a list of all subsidy recipients as
well as amount of subsidy assigned was given to the Wa West DMHIS office. The DMHIS
verified the names and amount assigned when vouchers were presented for redemption and
retained the redeemed voucher. An amount equivalent to half the total value of vouchers
issued was deposited with the scheme at the start of the subsidy intervention. The scheme
continued to redeem vouchers in excess of this amount and was reimbursed at two weeks
interval for additional vouchers redeemed until the end of the validity period.
1.3.2 Data collection
The sampling frame was limited to communities with 30-400 residents that are at least 1km
from the nearest other community. The size restriction was informed by budgetary con-
siderations because interventions were randomized at the community level. The distance
restriction was to minimize spillover of education and convenience interventions to neighbor-
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ing communities. All 61 communities meeting these criteria were included and all households
in these communities were interviewed.
The baseline survey was conducted in September 2011. Interventions were implemented
in October 2011 with the follow-up survey in April 2012. The household questionnaire used
for both surveys was adapted from the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey (GDHS) 2008
and the Ghana Livings Standards Survey 2005/2006 (GLSS V). The baseline survey collected
information on demographic characteristics, employment, health history, general health and
utilization of healthcare services, expected future health, enrollment in the NHIS and health
behaviors for all household members. Information on knowledge of health insurance was
collected from household heads or an adult respondent present if the household head was
not present. Information on pre-natal care, delivery and post-natal care was collected for all
women aged 15 to 49 years. Additional information on household characteristics, including
ownership of assets, and GIS information on all communities and health facilities in the
district was collected.
Table A.1 provides information on attrition. Panel A shows that the follow-up survey
successfully relocated almost 94% of individuals from the baseline sample. More importantly,
there is no statistically significant difference in attrition rate between treatments and control
groups. Panel B shows that among individuals who could not be relocated, 58% had traveled
outside the district, 26% had relocated outside the district and 8% were deceased.
1.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 presents descriptive characteristics from the baseline survey and tests of balance
between treatments and control groups. The first column reports summary values for the full
sample. The baseline survey collected information on 4625 individuals from 680 households
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in the 61 communities. The average household has 6.8 members, including 3.9 children under
18 years of age. The average age is 23 years. Forty-eight percent (48%) of individuals are
male and 80% of households are headed by males. Fifty-one percent (51%) of households
own a farmland and 59% own a mosquito net. Half of the households belong to the Dagaaba
ethnic group and about 43% are Christian. A third of all individuals have some formal
education.
In terms of health characteristics of the sample, 7% reported having a chronic health
condition lasting more than six months and 12% reported a sickness or injury in the last four
weeks. Utilization of formal healthcare is low even among those with illnesses. Only 8.7% of
all respondents (including 36% of those reporting illness or injury) visited a health facility in
the last four weeks. About 12.6% made a positive out-of-pocket health expenditure. Among
those reporting a positive expenditure, the average expenditure was GHC11.95 ($6.64) over
the four-week period. The average household lives within 5.36km of a health facility and
18.43km from the district capital where registration for NHIS takes place. The subjective
probability of being sick over the next 12 months is 0.447. Eleven percent (11%) of adults
respondents (18 years and above) are current or past smokers and 53% had an alcoholic
beverage in the two weeks before the baseline survey. About 54% of individuals reported
sleeping under a mosquito net the night before the survey.
Although 96% of adult respondents had heard about the NHIS, on average, they answered
less than 11 of 18 questions on knowledge of NHIS premiums levels, exemptions and benefits
correctly. Enrollment rate in the NHIS is 21% but 37% of individuals had registered with
the scheme once before. The re-enrollment rate is 63%.
The remaining columns of Table 1.1 present the balance test between the control and
treatment groups. All tests are pairwise comparisons between each treatment and the control
group and columns report mean differences. Tests adjust standard errors for intra-cluster
(intra-community) correlation. The table shows a good balance between treatments and
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control groups. Although there are statistically significant differences for some variables, the
magnitude of differences are small and the number of such significant differences (16) is not
very different from what is expected by chance for 182 comparisons at 10% level (18). Table
1.2 presents a similar balance test between the control group and subsidy treatments by level




I estimate reduced-form effects of being assigned to each treatment on various outcomes by
ordinary least squares estimation of the following equation:
yihc = α + β1subc + β2educ + β3convc + β4edu&convc + β5sub&convc+
β6sub&educ + β7sub&edu&convc +Xihcθ + Zhcδ + Vcω + εihc (1.1)
where i denotes an individual, h denotes a household and c denotes a community and yihc
refers to an outcome of interest. educc, subc and convc indicate assignment to education and
subsidy and convenience interventions respectively, b1- b7 are the reduced-form estimates
of the effect interventions on the outcome variable. educ&convc denotes an indicator for
assignment to education and convenience treatments. Xihc denote a set of individual-level
covariates that are potentially correlated with the outcome (individual’s age grouping (un-
der 18, 18-69 or 70+), gender, indicator for having some formal education, indicator for
having a health condition at baseline, indicator for visiting a health facility at baseline and
indicator for having ever registered with the NHIS). Zhc and Vc denote household-level co-
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variates (household size, religion, ethnicity, wealth) and community-level covariates (distance
to nearest health facility, distance to the district capital) respectively. The measure of house-
hold wealth used here is a three-category index constructed from principal component scores
of household assets. The outcomes considered here are: utilization of healthcare services,
out-of-pocket expenses, health status, and self-reported health status. In all estimations,
standard errors are clustered at the community level. Estimations employ linear probability
models (LPM).
1.4.2 Local Average Treatment Effect
Instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the effect of insurance coverage on the outcomes are
obtained from estimation of the following systems by two-stage least squares (2SLS):
enrolledihc = α + ρ1subc + ρ2educ + ρ3convc + ρ4edu&convc + ρ5sub&convc+
ρ6sub&educ + ρ7sub&edu&convc +Xihcϕ+ Zhcψ + Vc%+ υihc (1.2)
yihc = ν + pienrolledihc +Xihcσ + Zhcϑ+ Vcξ + µihc (1.3)
where enrolledihc is an indicator for being enrolled in the NHIS at the follow-up survey
and (2) is the first-stage estimation using treatment status as the excluded instrument. The
coefficient of interest, p, from the outcome equation (3) is the local average treatment effect
(LATE) of insurance coverage. It measures the causal effect of insurance among the subset





1.5.1.1 Effect of interventions on insurance take-up
Figure 1.4 presents the effect of the interventions on insurance coverage. The blue bars show
the baseline enrollment rate while the green bars show the rate at the follow-up. The figure
shows that enrollment rose slightly (about 7 percentage points) in the control group between
the baseline and follow-up. All interventions had strong effect on enrollment. The conve-
nience treatment had the weakest effect on enrollment: the increase in enrollment for this
treatment is similar to that of the control group. Moreover, adding the convenience inter-
vention to other interventions had little or no additional effect on enrollment. For instance,
the effect of the education only treatment is almost identical to the effect of the education
with convenience treatment. The subsidy with education treatment had the strongest effect
on enrollment, stronger than the treatment that combined all three interventions.
Table 1.3 presents results from the first-stage estimation. Each column represents a sep-
arate regression and the outcome variable is an indicator that an individual is enrolled in
the NHIS at follow-up. Column 1 reports regression without other covariates and columns
2-4 adds individual, household and community covariates. The results show that all but
the convenience only treatment have statistically significant positive effect on the enroll-
ment. Column 4, the preferred specification, shows that education only and subsidy only
treatments led to 14.7 and 37 percentage points increase in the likelihood of enrollment re-
spectively, representing 53% and 133% increase from the control group. The convenience
treatment is associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in the likelihood of insurance
take-up but this is not statistically significant. Moreover, adding the convenience treatment
to either education or subsidy or their combination does not change the coefficient of either
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intervention alone by much and formal tests confirm that convenience produces no signifi-
cant additional effects. Combining education and subsidy leads to a 52.5 percentage point
increase in the probability of being enrolled. This coefficient is not statistically different from
the sum of the coefficients on education only and subsidy only.17 This suggests that there is
no complementarity between the two interventions in terms of take-up of insurance. Similar
tests of interaction between education and convenience, and subsidy and convenience find
no evidence of complementarity. The F-statistic associated with the excluded instruments
is sufficiently high at 21.22.
Columns 5 and 6 report separate regressions for adults (18 years +) and children respec-
tively. They show that the effects are similar between the two groups with the exception of
the education intervention. The effect of education campaign is concentrated in adults mem-
bers, with coefficients of 0.261 (significant at 1% level) for adults and 0.05 (not statistically
significant) for children.
In sum, the results from Figure 1.4 and Table 1.3 suggest that incomplete information and
insurance premiums and fees are two of the factors behind the low take-up of the NHIS. The
absence of an effect of the convenience intervention may seem surprising given the significant
costs of traveling within the district. It might be the case that the “agent system” already
in place in the district have reduced costs associated with remoteness. While my results is
consistent with this reasoning, my study was not designed to test the effectiveness of this
system.
17More formally, a test of the null hypothesis: Subsidy & education - (subsidy only + education only) =
0 has a p-value of 0.9291
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1.5.1.2 Effect of education intervention of knowledge of NHIS
Table 1.4 investigates the effect of the interventions on knowledge of the NHIS. Although
96% of household heads or adult respondents reported that they had heard about the NHIS
at baseline, much of their knowledge of the NHIS were incomplete or inaccurate. In Table 1.4
knowledge of NHIS has been classified under three main headings: knowledge of premium
levels, exemptions and benefits. The knowledge of premiums outcome variable is generated
from questions asking respondents to quote the premiums and fees for children, adults and
the elderly in the Wa West District. Correct answers are tallied and standardized scores are
used as outcome variables. Outcome variables for knowledge of exemptions and benefits are
generated in a similar fashion. The fourth outcome variable is an aggregated standardized
score of all three knowledge variables. The regressions include controls for baseline score of
each outcome variable so the coefficients are difference-in-difference estimates.
The results in columns 1-3 show that the education intervention had significant positive
impact on all knowledge of all aspects of the NHIS. The coefficient on all treatments with
some education intervention is positive and statistically significant in 7 out of 12 instances.
The subsidy treatment also has positive impact on knowledge of NHIS although the mag-
nitudes are smaller and fewer of these coefficients are statistically significant. This possibly
reflects additional knowledge gained from interaction with NHIS officials during registration
process and/or use of services covered under the NHIS. Column 4 confirms these findings
using the aggregate measure of knowledge. The convenience intervention has no effect on
knowledge of NHIS. The results from this subsection indicate the education intervention
improved the knowledge of the NHIS of its recipients. The subsidy intervention also resulted
in slight improvement in knowledge of recipients.
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1.5.1.3 Effect of Subsidy level on Insurance take-up
Figure 1.5 and Table 1.5 present the effect of the subsidy level on enrollment. Figure 1.5
shows enrollment rates by levels of subsidy offered at baseline and follow-up. As expected,
the enrollment rate is increasing in the amount of subsidy offered. However, the differences
in enrollment rates by subsidy level is not very large, particularly between 2/3 subsidy
and full subsidy. The enrollment response to the 1/3 subsidy is strong: 1/3 subsidy is
associated with a 28 percentage point (or 100%) increase in enrollment. Table 1.5 presents the
corresponding regression results. In these regressions, I pull all subsidy recipients and include
dummy variables for receiving education and convenience interventions.18 Column 1 reports
regressions without other covariates while the columns 2-4 progressively add individual,
household and community covariates. As expected enrollment is increasing in the level of
subsidy offered. The preferred specification in column 4 shows that receiving 1/3, 2/3 and
full are associated with 26.2, 35.6 and 37.4 percentage points higher likelihood of enrolling
in insurance. The difference between 1/3 and 2/3, and between 1/3 and full subsidies are
statistically significant but the difference between 2/3 and full subsidy is not. Columns
5 and 6 report separate regressions for adults and children. They show similar effects of
subsidy levels on enrollment for children and adults. This suggest that although children
always receive full subsidy, their enrollment is still strongly related to the enrollment of adult
household members.
My elasticity estimate is much larger than the -0.2 estimated for United States by Man-
ning et al (1987). However, it is lower than estimates from previous experimental studies of
health products and services in Africa (Kremer and Miguel, 2007; Dupas, 2009; Cohen and
18
Table A.2 in the appendix presents results from regressions that isolates subsidy levels for subsidy only




The implied demand curve for health insurance is similar to those found by previous
studies for other types of insurance products in settings similar to mine. Karlan et al
(2012) randomize the price of rainfall index insurance in northern Ghana and find high price
elasticities. Cole et al (2013) and Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) also randomize the price
of a similar product in rural India and find similar results. All these studies randomized over
a larger range of prices than those in this chapter. My findings and those of others show
that price is a consistent driver of demand for insurance among the poor.
1.5.1.4 Heterogeneous impact of treatments
Tables A.3-A.6 in the appendix investigates possible heterogeneous response to the interven-
tions. Tables A.3 and A.4 present evidence on differential response by household’s socioeco-
nomic status. Column 1 of Table A.3 reports results from interacting an indicator for being
in the poorest third of household wealth distribution with treatment status. The results show
that the poorer households were more responsive to the subsidy intervention, especially when
combined with the education intervention. Among those receiving education and subsidy
treatments, enrollment was at least 25 percentage points higher for individuals in the poorest
third of the wealth distribution. Column 2 estimates response to subsidy levels by household
wealth. Relatively poor households were more likely to take advantage of the lower levels of
subsidies. Table A.4 presents similar evidence of heterogeneous response by education status
of the household head. Column 1 shows that individuals from households where the head is
19In Kremer and Miguel (2007), the introduction of a $0.15 user fee on deworming drugs led to a 62% drop
in take-up in Kenya. Dupas (2009) finds that an increase in the price of an insecticide-treated mosquito net
(ITN) in Kenya from $0 to $1 led to a 35 percentage point drop in take-up and a further 25 percentage point
drop when price increases from $1 to $2. In Cohen and Dupas (2010), take-up of ITN dropped by 60% when
price increased from $0 to $0.60. By contrast, my results suggest that an increase in the price of insurance
from $0 to $2.67 leads to a 2.8% fall in enrollment and a further increase in price from $2.67 to $5.67 leads
to a 14.8% percent fall in enrollment.
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educated were more responsive to the subsidy and education intervention, particularly the
combined education/subsidy treatment. Column 2 confirms that such households were also
more likely to use the 2/3 and full subsidies.
Tables A.5 and A.6 present results from interacting treatments with baseline health
status.20 Column 1 of Table A.5 shows that enrollment was higher among individuals with
chronic conditions at baseline especially among those receiving the education intervention.
Among recipients of the education only treatment, individuals with chronic conditions were
15.6 percentage points more likely to enroll. The coefficients for those receiving education
with subsidy and all three interventions are 10.5 and 16.3 percentage points respectively.
Column 2 shows that there is no interaction between subsidy level and chronic health status.
This indicates that the result in column 1 may have been driven by the education campaign.
Table A.6 focuses on individuals with “unmet need” for healthcare, defined as anyone with
a chronic health condition but who had not been receiving treatment for it at baseline. The
results are very similar to those from Table A.5. Among individuals from education only or
education with subsidy communities, those with unmet need for health care are more likely
to enroll in insurance. Unlike in Table A.5, there is an interaction between subsidy level and
unmet need. Among one-third subsidy recipients, those with unmet need at baseline were
more likely use the subsidy.
The results in this subsection shed more light on the first-stage results. They are in-
dicative of adverse selection on health condition and socioeconomic status. These are not
unexpected given baseline enrollment and utilization patterns. Baseline enrollment was
strongly correlated with wealth status: enrollment was 8.4 percentage points lower among
the poorest third of households. Moreover, while there was no difference in the incidence of
20In regressions not reported here, I also undertook similar investigations by baseline health expenditures,
probability of illness/injury over the coming year and expected health expenditure and found no systematic
patterns along these characteristics.
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illness by wealth status, use of health facility is strongly related to enrollment status and
visits to health facilities conditional on illness/injury was 3.7 percentage points lower for
their poorest third of households. This suggests that poorer households had higher unmet
need for healthcare services and responded more to the interventions.
1.5.2 Effect of Insurance Coverage on Care utilization, out-of-
pocket expenses and Health
1.5.2.1 Utilization of healthcare services
Table 1.6 presents the effects of insurance coverage on the utilization of healthcare services
in the short-run. Utilization is measured by i) an indicator for visiting a health facility in the
last four weeks, ii) an indicator for visiting a health facility in the last six months, iii) number
of visits to a health facility in the last six months and iv) an indicator for visiting a facility to
seek treatment for malaria, the leading cause of OPD visits in the district. Panel A presents
the IV results. Insurance coverage leads to an increase in utilization of healthcare services.
The coefficient on insured is positive and statistically significant in all regressions. The
effects are strong: utilization increases by 120% to 211% among individuals induced to take
up insurance by the interventions. Table A.7 in the appendix presents results separately for
adults (odd-numbered columns) and children (even-numbered columns). Although insurance
coverage increases utilization for both children and adults, effects are stronger for children.
Indeed, columns 7 and 8 show that insurance coverage increases the probability of visiting a
facility for malaria treatment for children but not for adults.
Columns 1-4 Panel B present the reduced-form results. Both education alone and sub-
sidy alone have positive but statistically insignificant effects on utilization. The combined
education and subsidy treatment has the strongest impact on utilization of healthcare ser-
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vices across all outcomes except visiting a facility for malaria treatment. The treatment
combining all three interventions is positive and significant across all specifications but the
magnitude is smaller than the education with subsidy treatment in all but column 4.
The magnitude of coefficients in Panel B suggest there is complementarity between the
education and subsidy. This contrasts with results from the first-stage. The preferred first-
stage specification is reproduced in column 5 for ease of comparison. Panel C performs a
formal test of the complementarities between the education and subsidy interventions by
testing the hypothesis that the sum of education only and subsidy only treatments is equal
to the combined education and subsidy treatment. The F-statistic and p-values from these
tests are reported. The null hypothesis (of no complementarity) is rejected in all cases for
the utilization outcomes (columns 1-4) but it is not rejected in the first-stage (column 5).
This implies that while education and subsidy may each have strong effects on enrollment,
it is the combination of the two that induces changes in health-seeking behavior. It also
suggests that besides financial cost, cost of information remains a significant barrier to
utilization of healthcare services in this setting. More generally, this result also speaks to
an ongoing lively policy debate about the design of multiple interventions. This debate has
been rekindled by the Millennium Villages Project which simultaneously introduce multiple
interventions in villages in rural Africa (Pronyk et al 2012). Although complementarities
among interventions is a key underlying assumption behind this approach, this has not been
demonstrated rigorously at the micro level. My results provide a convincing demonstration
of the existence of such complementarities.
Table 1.7 presents reduced-form effect of subsidy levels on utilization of healthcare ser-
vices. The effect of prices on utilization of health products and services has received consid-
erable attention in recent times following the introduction of user fees on social services in
developing countries. Proponents of user fees argue that cost-sharing is necessary for sustain-
ability of public programs because positive prices screen out users with low need for services
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and reduces waste of subsidy money (World Bank 1993; Easterly, 2006). Recent empirical
work using randomized designs to test the existence of such screening effects of higher prices
have found mixed results. While Ashraf et al (2010) find that high prices stimulate product
use through screening effect, Dupas (2009) and Cohen and Dupas (2010) find no effect of
higher prices on product use. The current design allows estimation of causal impact of price
on use of healthcare services without disentangling selection effect from sunk cost effect.21
Consistent with Dupas (2009) and Cohen and Dupas (2010), Table 6 finds no evidence
that the utilization of healthcare services is increasing in the price paid for insurance. For all
four outcomes, there are no statistically significant differences in the use healthcare by the
level of subsidy received. Indeed, the coefficient on all three subsidy levels are not statistically
different from zero.
1.5.2.2 Effect on Out-Of-Pocket Expenses
Table 1.8 presents the IV estimates of the effect of insurance coverage on out-of-pocket
(OOP) expenses. Columns 1 and 2 present the effects at the extensive margin using an
indicator for making a positive OOP health expenditure in the last 4 weeks as the outcome
variable. Column 1 shows that insurance coverage has no effect on the probability of making
OOP expenses in the last 4 weeks. Indeed, the coefficient on being insured is positive but
not statistically significant. Column 2 includes an indicator for making a positive OOP
at the baseline. Insurance coverage reduces the probability by 2.7 percentage points for
those who made positive OOP expenses at baseline. Columns 3-6 examines the effect on
amount of OOP expenses made in the last 4 weeks. Columns 3 and 4 uses the raw amounts
while columns 5 and 6 account for the skewed distribution of health expenditures by using
21An aspect of this project that employs a design similar to Ashraf et al (2010) to isolate the selection
effect from sunk cost effect is currently on-going.
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predicted expenditures from a Tobit estimation. The results mirror those in columns 1 and
2. Insurance coverage has no effect on the amount of OOP expenses for the general sample
but reduces leads to a slight reduction for those with prior such expenses.
Table 1.9 presents the reduced-form results. As with Table 1.8, the outcome variable
in columns 1 and 2 is an indicator for making a positive OOP expense and the outcome
variable for columns 3-6 is the amount of OOP expense. The coefficients on most treatments
are negative but are very small and not statistically significant. The only exception is
education with subsidy treatment which has a negative and statistically signficant at both
the extensive and intensive margins.
The finding that insurance coverage has no effect on the probability of making OOP
expenses for the general sample is somewhat surprising because many previous studies,
experimental and non-experimental, have found that insurance is associated with a reduction
in OOP payments. However, it is consistent with Brugiavini and Pace (2010) who find weak
effects of the NHIS on out-of-pocket expenses using data from a nationally representative
sample in Ghana. The difference from other studies may be explained by the fact that in this
setting, people without insurance hardly seek care at the health facilities and rather resort to
the use of traditional/herbal medicines obtained at virtually zero price. Indeed, only 12.6%
of individuals made positive out-of-pocket expenses at baseline. With insurance, there is
substitution from traditional medicines to formal health facilities but this does not involve
any expenses because of the absence of co-payment. But for those who had made positive




Table 1.10 presents the effect of insurance coverage on health measures. My measures of
health are: i) number of days an individual suffered an illness in the last month; ii) an
indicator for not being able to perform normal daily activities in the last month; iii) the
number of days in the last month that an individual was unable to perform normal daily
activities,22 and iv) number of days a person who reported an illness or injury waited before
seeking care at a health facility.
Even-numbered columns report IV estimates while odd-numbered columns report reduced-
form results. Column 1 shows that the insurance coverage is associated with 0.339 fewer days
of illness suffered. This represents a 42% reduction from the control group. Columns 3-6
show the effect of coverage on ability to perform usual activities as a result of illness. There
is no effect on ability to perform normal daily activities at the extensive margin although the
coefficient has the expected sign. There is however a strong effect at the intensive margin.
Column 5 shows that insurance coverage leads to 0.805 fewer days of inability to perform
normal daily activities, a 51% reduction from the control group. Columns 7 shows that
insurance coverage also leads to 1.57 fewer waiting days before seeking care although this is
not statistically significant due to reduced sample size. As with utilization of healthcare, the
reduced-form results show that the LATE effects of coverage on health are mainly driven by
the combined education and subsidy treatments.
Table 1.11 presents additional results on the effects of insurance coverage on health using
self-reported health outcomes. I use seven measures of self-reported health. The first is an
22In essence, this measure is similar to Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) commonly used in the literature
although it is derived differently. In the literature ADLs are usually constructed from asking respondents
questions about their ability to perform basic daily activities such as self-feeding, ambulation, dressing and
undressing etc. The variables used here are derived from the following questions “During the last month did
(NAME) have to stop his/her usual activities because of this (illness/injury)” and “For how many days (in
the last one month) was name unable to do his/her usual activities”. One advantage of my measure is that
it is directly linked to illness/injury
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indicator for being happy or very happy created from a question asking respondents to rank
their general state of happiness (very happy, happy, so-so, unhappy, very unhappy). The
second is an indicator for being healthy or very healthy generated from a question asking
respondents to rank the overall state of their health (very healthy, healthy, so-so, unhealthy,
very unhealthy). The other measures are an indicator for improvement in health status in
the last seven months, number of days in the last month that the respondent’s physical
health was not good, the number of days in the last month that the respondent’s mental
health was not good, an indicator for feeling depressed and an indicator for being hopeful
about the future.23
Panel A presents the IV results. All but one of the seven measures have the expected
signs and four are statistically significant. Insurance coverage leads to 21.8, 13.7 and 12.5
percentage point increases in the probability of being happy or very happy, being healthy
or very healthy and being hopeful about the future respectively. Individuals with insurance
coverage also have 0.684 fewer days of being in poor mental health. Those with insurance
coverage are however 1.1 percentage points less likely to report that their health status has
improved although this is not statistically significant. Panel B reports the reduced-form
estimates. Consistent with the results on utilization of healthcare services above, education
with subsidy treatment is the major driver of the effect on self-reported health.
Although the results in this section indicate significant improvement as a result of in-
surance coverage, given the subjective nature of the outcomes considered here, there may
be concerns about the extent to which they reflect actual improvements in physical health.
While these concerns may be valid, they are not specific to this chapter. Moreover, the fact
that the reduced-form results mimic the findings from utilization of healthcare suggests that
23The self-reported health variables are available only for 1335 adult household members who were available
on the day of the follow-up survey. I have checked that all previous results hold for this restricted sample
although the magnitudes differ slightly when compared with the full adult sample.
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the findings on health may be due to interactions with the healthcare system.
1.6 Conclusion
Many developing countries have recently set up social health insurance schemes (SHIs) to ease
financial barriers to utilization of healthcare services and help mitigate the effect of adverse
health shocks on the poor. Although these SHIs offer generous terms and benefits, enrollment
remains low especially among vulnerable populations who are the primary targets. In this
chapter, I implemented randomized interventions to test the role of pricing, information and
convenience of signing up in low enrollment. I then used the resulting variation in insurance
coverage to estimate the effect of insurance coverage on utilization of healthcare services,
out-of-pocket expenses and health outcomes.
I find that the additional convenience of signing up provided by my interventions had no
effect on enrollment but providing information and giving subsidies led to significant increase
in enrollment. My results suggest that the demand for insurance is price elastic in the sense
that a moderate subsidy for insurance premiums leads to substantial increase in enrollment.
I also find that insurance coverage leads to increased utilization of healthcare services
and improvement in health outcomes, both self-reported and more objective measures of
health. Unlike the first-stage, I find evidence of strong complementarity between providing
information and providing subsidy in terms of utilization of healthcare services and health
outcomes. This is an important finding because it indicates that while education and subsidy
can each increase enrollment, it is the combination of two interventions that leads to changes
in health-seeking behavior and improvement in health. I do not find any effect of insurance
coverage on the probability of making out-of-pocket health expenditures in this setting where
very few people make positive such expenditures. However, insurance coverage leads to a
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moderate reduction in probability of paying out of pocket among individuals who made
positive expenditures at the baseline.
The findings of this chapter raises several questions. Given the short duration between
the enrollment and follow-up survey (the average individual had been enrolled for 4.8 months
at the time of the follow-up survey), my results on utilization and health outcomes represent
the short-run effects of insurance coverage. To what extent will these differ from the longer-
run effects? Furthermore, the strong effect of the education campaign suggests that learning
about the benefits of insurance may be important. To what extent will such learning affect
subsequent enrollment behavior in the absence of the interventions? Planned future work
on this long-term project will seek to address these and other important questions.
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Note: Numbers refer to communities and numbers in brackets refer to affected households.








Notes: Based on number of affected households. Both subsidy level and voucher type are stratified by
broader treatment arms in Figure 1a.
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Figure 1.3: Sample Subsidy Voucher
REDEEM AT WA WEST DISTRICT NHIS
SEND - GHANA
valid until :23/12/2011
Subsidy voucher for NHIS
NAME AGE GENDER   AMOUNT
REDEEM AT WA WEST DISTRICT NHIS
SEND - GHANA
valid until :23/12/2011
Subsidy voucher for NHIS
NAME AGE GENDER    AMOUNT
REDEEM AT WA WEST DISTRICT NHIS
SEND - GHANA
valid until :23/12/2011
Subsidy voucher for NHIS
NAME AGE GENDER   AMOUNT
REDEEM AT WA WEST DISTRICT NHIS
SEND - GHANA
valid until :23/12/2011
Subsidy voucher for NHIS
NAME AGE GENDER   AMOUNT
Community: Kapru        
I
Asamoah Gyan                          48     M        8.1
Adwoa                                        41     F         8.1 
Felicia                                        16      F         4
Kwame                                      12      M        4
Akosua                                       79     F         4
Antuo Brimah                                66       M     
Rianatu                                         61        F
Chorayele                                     21       M
Iddrisu                                          19        M
Total amount for this  household: GHC 16.00
Community: Kapru
Ibrahim Yahya                             50     M             
Fatima                                         40      F           
Fuseina                                       16      F           
Iddrisu                                         13      M           
Bukari                                          11      M          
Total amount for this household: GHC 28.20
Community: Kapru
Shilla Alhassan                           37     M        4
Maamuna                                   35      F        4
Yakubu                                        9       M        4
Abdul                                          4       M        4
Community: Kapru
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control subsidy educ conve educ+conve subsidy+conve subsidy+educ all three
baseline 95% CI
follow-up 95% CI
Notes: Figure is based on full sample of 4298 individuals. Conve, educ and subsidy refer to assisngment to
convenience only, education only and subsidy only inteventions respectively. educ + conve, subsidy+conve
and subsidy+educ refer to assignment to education and convenience, subsidy and convenience, and subsidy
and education interventions. All three refers to assignment to subsidy, education and convenience
intervention.
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control one-third two-thirds full
baseline 95% CI
follow-up 95% CI
Notes: Figure is based on sample of subsidy only and pure control groups. One-third, two-thirds and full
refer to assignment to 1/3 subsidy, 2/3 subsidy and full subsidy respectively.
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Table 1.1: Balance Between Treatments and Control Groups (All Treatments)
 
 Variable            Full Control       subsidy        Educ.    Conve.     Edu/conv sub/conve        sub/educ        All 3     
         mean         minus           minus       minus       minus         minus              minus             minus 
                 control         control      control      control control            control            control 
      
Observations (N)   4625  1313       709              327     604          328    481             300          561 
Age               22.956 24.313       0.842          1.661         2.129         0.856          1.930             -1.532              1.102  
Male                 0.483   0.476       -0.009         -0.014         0.015       -0.023           0.020             -0.022            -0.032 
Has some formal education              0.335   0.337       0.025          0.030        -0.006        0.148*         0.038              0.045             -0.019  
Has a health condition [≥6 months] 0.070   0.072        0.002          0.011        -0.000        0.012          -0.018              0.004             -0.002 
Has been ill in the last month              0.120   0.109       -0.003         -0.030         0.040        0.031          -0.033            -0.027             -0.018  
Has recently visited health facility          0.087   0.085       -0.002         -0.003         0.007       -0.005          -0.024            -0.008              0.008  
Made out of pocket expense                    0.126   0.133        0.001          0.007         0.020        -0.032         -0.013             -0.017              0.007  
Health expend. in last month [GHC]       11.95   13.07        3.827**     -1.283         1.213        2.519          -2.666*            0.020              2.226 
Probably will be sick in the next year     0.447   0.468        0.004          0.059         0.008         0.040          -0.028             0.033              0.059   
Heard of the NHIS              0.960   0.958      -0.002          0.000    -0.003        0.001  -0.002            -0.001          0.002 
Knowledge of NHIS (raw score)a           10.710  10.576       0.044         -0.409        -0.353       -0.289          -0.068            -0.055              0.008  
Ever enrolled in NHIS   0.374   0.338       -0.084         -0.085**    -0.022      -0.022          -0.091*           -0.074              0.070   
Currently enrolled in NHIS  0.205   0.201        0.011         -0.045        -0.006       -0.056          -0.024             0.011             -0.011    
Re-enrolled in NHIS   0.629   0.700        0.023          0.102          0.013        0.123           0.108             0.136*             0.132  
Ever smoked    0.110   0.117        0.013         -0.006        -0.015       -0.012           0.024            -0.028              0.040 
Drank alcohol in last 2 weeks  0.528   0.524       -0.001         -0.036         0.042       -0.048          -0.015            -0.038              0.052 
Slept under mosquito net last night 0.544   0.452       -0.080         -0.103*      -0.004        0.041          -0.152*          -0.089              0.080 
 
Christian                 0.432   0.422       -0.048          0.090         0.005        0.091            0.014            -0.207**         -0.067   
Dagaaba     0.502   0.438       -0.046         -0.045        0.015       -0.015            0.041             -0.170*           -0.059    
Household size    6.805   6.944        0.214         -1.099        0.431         0.164           -0.805             0.862             -0.956 
Number of children under 18  3.874   3.697      -0.050         -1.006       -0.116        0.166           -0.787             0.536             -0.946 
Head is male    0.800   0.808       -0.007         -0.076        0.095*     -0.069           -0.008            -0.081             -0.062 
Owns farming land   0.509   0.480      -0.217*       -0.020        0.013        0.058           -0.067             0.105              -0.027 
Owns a mosquito net   0.590   0.544       -0.084         -0.106        0.135       -0.031            0.128*          -0.125*             0.029 
Distance to NHIS regist. (km)             18.436   21.286     -2.001          0.087        5.236**    2.119           -3.246              0.071               2.981 
Distance to health fac. (km)  5.359   5.501        0.981          1.092         0.049       -0.119           0.563              1.290              -0.982 
 
a: out of 18 questions about the NHIS. 1$ = 1.5 GHC. Reported differences are from pairwise t-tests of differences between each treatment and the control group. 
All tests of differences adjust standard errors for intra-cluster (intra-village) correlation.  *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. Dagaaba refer to an ethnic group. 
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Table 1.2: Balance Between Treatments and Control Groups (Subsidy Levels)
 
    Control     1/3 subsidy       2/3 subsidy       full subsidy    
    Mean        minus                minus              minus            
           control              control            control          
 
Number of individuals   1313        476             559       983              
Age     24.313      -1.696             0.399       1.458          
Male     0.476        -0.015              0.012      -0.021          
Has some formal education  0.337      0.005            0.001      -0.015          
Has a health condition                0.072                -0.015             -0.014      -0.006         
Has been ill in the last month      0.109              -0.049             -0.031         -0.019         
Has visited health facility  0.085       0.033              -0.019       0.004          
Made out of pocket expense        0.133             -0.004              -0.049       0.015          
Health expend. in last month       13.07        0.614              -0.638       0.884          
Probably will be sick next year    0.468             -0.006            0.018       0.041          
Heard of the NHIS   0.958       0.002            0.001      -0.002         
Knowledge of NHIS                   10.576              -0.089              -0.412          0.130         
Ever enrolled in NHIS    0.338             0.139*             -0.056      -0.077         
Currently enrolled in NHIS   0.201            -0.057               -0.040       0.042          
Re-enrolled in NHIS   0.700             0.106           0.020       0.172**       
Ever smoked    0.117            -0.001           0.057**      -0.001          
Drank alcohol in last 2 weeks  0.524             0.028           0.027      -0.013         
Slept under mosquito net    0.452            -0.108              -0.105      -0.008         
 
Christian    0.422              -0.133              -0.110      -0.076         
Dagaaba                0.438              -0.158              -0.140       0.025         
Household size    6.944               0.271              -0.081         -0.567          
Number of children under 18  3.697           -0.055              -0.162      -0.699         
Head is male    0.808              0.037               -0.049      -0.048         
Owns farming land   0.480           -0.102              -0.052      -0.107         
Owns a mosquito net   0.544             -0.141              -0.209**     -0.096          
Distance to NHIS regist. (km)  21.286           -3.122              -1.659       4.601          
Distance to health fac. (km)  5.501              0.046               0.096           0.573           
 
Notes: *, ** and *** refers to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All tests of differences 
adjust standard errors for intra-cluster correlation ie intra-community/village correlation. Dagaaba refers to an ethnic 
group.
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Table 1.3: First-stage: Effect of Interventions on Enrollment in NHIS
 
   Outcome variable: indicator = 0 for not enrolled, 1 for enrolled 
                               (1)             (2)      (3)                (4)           (5)        (6)     
 
Education only  0.229**          0.208**      0.156**        0.147**        0.261***       0.050       
   (0.105)           (0.083)      (0.080)          (0.072)         (0.096)     (0.072)   
Subsidy only  0.365***        0.372***      0.361***      0.370***      0.328****     0.408*** 
   (0.064)           (0.054)      (0.050) (0.049)         (0.063)          (0.050) 
Convenience  0.046            0.039       0.035  0.013           -0.012      0.016 
   (0.082)           (0.062)      (0.048)          (0.048)         (0.060)          (0.070)  
Educ & convenience 0.203*            0.197*      0.157*           0.186*          0.223*      0.170      
   (0.113)           (0.110)      (0.095)          (0.108)          (0.127)      (0.140) 
Subsidy & conve. 0.429***        0.396***      0.368***       0.354***      0.363***       0.340*** 
   (0.063)           (0.062)      (0.061)          (0.066)         (0.074)      (0.077)  
Subsidy & educ  0.551***        0.562***      0.499***       0.525***      0.607***       0.444*** 
   (0.071)           (0.066)      (0.065)          (0.070)         (0.081)           (0.079) 
Subsidy&educ&conve 0.523***        0.531***      0.495***       0.455***      0.470***        0.444***  
   (0.054)           (0.058)      (0.057)          (0.064)         (0.072)           (0.063) 
 
Individual covariates             X        X                   X            X        X 
Household covariates                             X     X            X        X 
Community covariates                                      X            X        X 
Mean for control group 0.279          0.279     0.279 0.279           0.235       0.329 
N   4298           4298     4298  4298              1995       2303     
F-statistic  18.54           20.73     19.07 21.22             19.41       20.57      
R2   0.1738           0.2527     0.2713 0.2773           0.2986       0.2817   
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. F-statistic is for excluded instruments (interventions). 
Individual covariates are: age group (<18 years, 18-69, and 70+), gender, education status, indicator for having ever 
registered with the NHIS at baseline, and indicator having visited a health facility at baseline. Household covariates
are: household size, religion, ethnicity and wealth index (poor third, middle third and rich third). Community 
covariates are: distance to nearest health facility, distance to NHIS registration center. Columns (5) and (6) restricts 
sample to adults aged 18 and above and children under 18 respectively. 
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Table 1.4: Effect of Education Intervention on Knowledge of NHIS
 
Dependent variable:           Knowledge of       Knowledge of   Knowledge of         Overall knowledge 
                    premiums         benefits    exemptions        of NHIS 
        (1)   (2)       (3)   (4) 
 
Education      0.237           0.182**      0.293***  0.901* 
       (0.183)           (0.074)      (0.091)  (0.516) 
Subsidy      0.099           -0.017      0.094  0.731* 
       (0.100)            (0.083)      (0.101)  (0.406) 
Conve regist      -0.035            -0.036      0.070  -0.083 
        (0.074)            (0.062)      (0.113)  (0.332) 
Educ. &conve reg      0.278**            0.054       0.160  0.641 
        (0.140)            (0.073)      (0.150)  (0.503) 
Subsidy & conve reg.      0.074            0.021       0.152  0.337 
        (0.070)            (0.104)       (0.177)  (0.452) 
Subsidy & educ.      0.255**            0.123**       0.270***  1.129** 
        (0.116)            (0.062)       (0.076)  (0.441) 
Subsidy & educ & conve    0.239            0.065        0.239*  0.683** 
        (0.225)            (0.062)        (0.135)  (0.279) 
Baseline knowledge of 
premiums       0.270**             
        (0.138)            
Baseline knowledge of 
benefits                 0.271***     
                 (0.080) 
Baseline knowledge of              
exemptions              0.259*** 
               (0.084) 
Baseline knowledge of  
NHIS           0.439*** 
           (0.132) 
 
N           531  531                 531  531 
F-statistic          9.35  10.23           7.48  5.34 
R2                       0.1381  0.1384           0.3120  0.4817 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The sample for all regressions is restricted to household heads 
or adult household members present at the time of the follow-up survey. All regressions include a full set of 
covariates (individual, household, community). 
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Table 1.5: Effect of Subsidy Levels on Enrollment in NHIS
 
Outcome variable: indicator = 0 for not enrolled, 1 for enrolled 
 (1)  (2)          (3)     (4)  (5)                 (6) 
 
1/3 Subsidy   0.287***        0.284***        0.254***     0.262***       0.253***       0.279***   
   (0.068)           (0.066)        (0.060)     (0.060)          (0.070)          (0.080)  
2/3 subsidy  0.378***        0.374***        0.347***     0.356***       0.347***       0.358***  
   (0.054)           (0.057)        (0.055)     (0.052) (0.062)          (0.059) 
Full subsidy  0.407***        0.390***        0.377***     0.374***       0.375***       0.375*** 
   (0.059)           (0.054)        (0.054)     (0.054)          (0.063)          (0.056) 
Education   0.152**          0.143**         0.139**     0.130**         0.195***        0.073 
   (0.066)           (0.059)        (0.059)     (0.058)          (0.061)           (0.064) 
Conve regist.  0.017            0.001        0.001     0.023             -0.010           0.039  
   (0.062)            (0.049)        (0.042)           (0.045)           (0.049)           (0.058) 
  
Individual covariates             X          X                   X                X             X 
Household covariates                               X       X                X             X 
Community covariates                                        X                X             X 
Mean for control group 0.279          0.279        0.279     0.279             0.235            0.329  
N   4298           4298        4298    4298              1995            2283 
F-statistic  25.06           25.22        21.71    21.21             18.40                19.58 
R2   0.1700           0.2491        0.2760    0.2768           0.3000              0.2582 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. F-statistic is for excluded instruments (interventions). 
Individual covariates are: age group (<18 years, 18-69, and 70+), gender, education status, indicator for having ever 
registered with the NHIS at baseline, and indicator having visited a health facility at baseline. Household covariates 
are: household size, religion, ethnicity and wealth index (poor third, middle third and rich third). Community 
covariates are: distance to nearest health facility, distance to NHIS registration center. Columns (5) and (6) restrict 
sample to adults aged 18 and above and children under 18 respectively. 
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Table 1.6: Effect of Interventions on Utilization of Healthcare Services
 
Dependent variable:       Visited facility  Visited facility  # of visits in    Visited facility for   Enrolled 
    in last 4 weeks  in 6 months      last 6 months   malaria treatment 
       (1)    (2)         (3)        (4)              (5) 
 
Panel A: IV results 
 
Insured       0.140*** 0.151*** 0.324*** 0.038** 
       (0.052) (0.055)  (0.125)  (0.015) 
 
Control mean      0.116 0.103  0.203  0.018 
R2       0.0755 0.0672  0.0514  0.0134 
 
Panel B: Reduced-form and first-stage results 
 
Education                0.019   0.024       0.103   0.016    0.147** 
                 (0.027)    (0.027)     (0.068)  (0.091)    (0.072) 
Subsidy only              0.026          0.012       0.015  0.002                0.370*** 
               (0.020)  (0.018)        (0.051)  (0.006)    (0.049) 
Conve. regist.           -0.026  -0.019         -0.008  -0.001    0.013 
                   (0.022)  (0.023)      (0.070)  (0.009)    (0.048) 
Educ & conve                 0.041    0.050          0.073  0.004    0.186* 
                  (0.048)  (0.049)    (0.087)  (0.015)    (0.108) 
Subsidy & educ                 0.106***    0.122***      0.285*** 0.010    0.525*** 
                   (0.032)  (0.040)        (0.054)  (0.009)    (0.070) 
Subsidy & conve                0.005        0.014            0.023  -0.000    0.354*** 
                  (0.040)  (0.036)      (0.090)  (0.009)    (0.066) 
Subsidy&educ&conve       0.106***      0.109***     0.252***  0.033***   0.455*** 
                   (0.031)  (0.029)         (0.062)   (0.010)    (0.064) 
N       4298             4298  4298  4298    4298 
R2       0.0844  0.0752 0.0526  0.0169    0.2773 
 
Panel C: Test of complementarity 
 
Hypothesis:   Subsidy & education  - (subsidy only + education) = 0 
 
F-statistic (p-value)   7.07(0.01) 5.72(0.02) 4.58(0.04) 4.53(0.04) 0.008(0.929) 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include a full set of individual-level and 
household/community-level covariates. Individual-level covariates are: age-group (<18 and 70+, 18-69 is omitted), 
gender, indicator for having a health condition, indicator for visiting a health facility at baseline, education status. 
Household/community-level covariates are: household wealth (poorest third and richest third, middle third omitted), 
household size, religion, ethnicity, distance to nearest health facility and distance to NHIS registration point. 
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Table 1.7: Effect of Subsidy Level on Utilization of Healthcare Services
 
Dependent variable:       Visited facility      Visited facility      # of visits in    Visit facility for 
 in last month      in last 6 months    last 6 months     malaria treatment    
           (1)   (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
1/3 subsidy          0.020  0.005  0.028  0.009 
           (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.058)  (0.007) 
2/3 subsidy          0.023  0.015  0.023  0.012 
           (0.025)   (0.025)  (0.079)  (0.009) 
Full subsidy          0.027  0.010  0.021  0.002 
           (0.028)  (0.031)  (0.083)  (0.007) 
 
N            2022  2022  2022  2022 
R2            0.0814  0.0743  0.0580  0.0186 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Sample for all regressions is restricted to subsidy only and 
control households. All regressions include a full set of covariates (individual, household and community).
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Table 1.8: Effect of Insurance Coverage on Out-of-Pocket Expenses (IV)
 
Outcome variable:         Made positive 
                           out-of-pocket  
                                      health expense in             Total out-of-pocket expenses made in the 
                                      last the last 4 weeks                        last 4 weeks 
                                             OLS                                  OLS                          Tobit 
       (1)               (2)         (3)  (4)          (5)       (6) 
  
Insured               0.020          0.019        0.731  0.787           2.170     2.088 
                 (0.014)       (0.013)        (1.240)     (1.131)        (1.716)      (1.672) 
 
Had positive health 
expend. at baseline           -0.027***   0.458*              -1.978* 
                                   (0.010)              (0.246)                          (1.066) 
 
N                 4298           4298          4298       4298          4298           4298 
R2      0.0056        0.0100          0.0018    0.2166         0.0211        0.0334 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, *** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include a full set of covariates. All regressions 
include individual controls [age group (<18 years, 18-69, and 70+), gender, education status, indicator for having 
ever registered with the NHIS at baseline, and indicator having visited a health facility at baseline], household 
controls (household size, religion, ethnicity and wealth index: poor third, middle third and rich third) and community 
controls (distance to the nearest health facility and distance to the NHIS registration point). The out-of-pocket 
expense outcome variable for columns 3 and 4 are raw outcome variable while those for (5) and (6) are predicted 
using a Tobit model. 
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Table 1.9: Effect of Insurance Coverage on Out-of-Pocket Expenses (Reduced-form)
 
Outcome variable:    Made positive 
                        out-of-pocket  
                                 health expense in             Total out-of-pocket expenses made in the 
                               last the last 4 weeks                                last 4 weeks 
                                             OLS                                  OLS                              Tobit 
     (1)            (2)                (3)             (4)             (5)       (6) 
  
 
Education            -0.005        -0.005      -1.103         -1.118*         -0.858         -0.813 
              (0.010)        (0.010)       (0.745)        (0.670)          (0.744)        (0.712) 
Subsidy only            -0.009        -0.000      -0.837          0.829            -1.714*      -1.695*  
   (0.013)        (0.007)      (0.873)        (0.666)          (1.031)        (1.012) 
Conve. regist.  0.012        0.012       2.282**       2.243**         2.483*        2.380* 
   (0.011)        (0.010)          (0.956)        (0.925)           (1.394)       (1.317) 
Educ & conve            -0.005       -0.005       -0.863         -0.716            -0.577        -0.568 
   (0.010)        (0.009)       (0.775)        (0.832)           (1.229)       (1.176) 
Subsidy & educ  -0.024**     -0.024**        -1.577**     -1.759**         -2.210**    -1.974** 
   (0.011)        (0.010)       (0.775)        (0.771)           (0.840)       (0.817) 
Subsidy & conve 0.003           0.003      -0.860         -0.908             0.708         0.736 
   (0.017)        (0.017)      (0.695)        (0.679)           (0.837)       (0.833) 
Subsidy&educ&conve -0.009         -0.009            -0.588         -0.540            -0.844        -0.866 
   (0.014)        (0.009)      (0.715)        (0.655)           (0.960)       (0.861) 
 
Had positive health 
expend. at baseline         -0.029*              1.843**                           -1.622** 
           (0.016)              (0.903)                             (0.779) 
 
N   4298          4298       4298           4298            4298        4298 
R2    0.0184          0.0567       0.0103        0.0150            0.2859          0.2891 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, *** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include a full set of covariates. All regressions 
include individual controls [age group (<18 years, 18-69, and 70+), gender, education status, indicator for having 
ever registered with the NHIS at baseline, and indicator having visited a health facility at baseline], household 
controls (household size, religion, ethnicity and wealth index: poor third, middle third and rich third) and community 
controls (distance to the nearest health facility and distance to the NHIS registration point). The out-of-pocket 
expense outcome variable for columns 3 and 4 are raw outcome variable while those for (5) and (6) are predicted 
using a Tobit model. 
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Table 1.10: Effect of Insurance Coverage on Health (IV and Reduced-form)
 
Dependent variable:       # of days been       Could not perform      # of days could not       days waited 
            ill in the last           normal daily activities  perform normal daily           before seeking 
             one month                 due to illness  activities due to illness               care  
   IV  Reduced-form      IV        Reduced-form        IV      Reduced-form    IV        Reduced-form 
   (1)               (2)       (3)  (4)  (5)     (6)     (7)  (8) 
 
Insured             -0.339*      -0.027                                  -0.805**    -1.572 
              (0.203)      (0.030)                                 (0.340)    (0.987) 
 
Education           -0.073                 -0.015               -0.363    -0.951 
            (0.213)                   (0.016)                 (0.428)    (0.628) 
Subsidy only           -0.163                 -0.029**            -0.622*    -0.416 
            (0.172)                 (0.012)                 (0.350)    (0.941) 
Conve. regist.           0.061                 0.039                 0.228         5.212*** 
            (0.267)                (0.019)                  (0.501)    (0.682) 
Educ & conve           0.018                  0.016                 -0.394    0.450 
            (0.328)                (0.009)                   (0.544)    (1.015) 
Subsidy & educ          -0.421***                -0.044**             -0.880***   -0.683 
            (0.139)                        (0.010)                   (0.329)    (0.756) 
Subsidy & conve         -0.343*                        -0.028**                -0.755*    -0.407 
            (0.179)                (0.012)                 (0.442)    (1.014) 
Subsidy&educ&conve         -0.391**                -0.040***             -0.828**   -0.509 
           (0.177)                        (0.015)                 (0.331)    (0.932)  
 
Control mean                   0.809           0.063     1.582            2.733 
 
N   4281      4281           4281            4281      4281  4281  391   391 
R2              0.0219      0.0170         0.0228            0.0365    0.1627  0.1465  0.1388   0.1686  
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 10 and 1% levels 
respectively. Even-numbered columns report IV estimates; odd-numbered columns report reduced-form estimate. All regressions include both individual-level 
and household/community-level variables. Individual-level covariates are: age-group (<18 and 70+, 18-69 is omitted), gender, indicator for having a health 
condition, indicator for visiting a health facility at baseline, education status. Household/community-level covariates are: household wealth (poorest third and 
richest third, middle third omitted), household size, religion, ethnicity, distance to nearest health facility and distance to NHIS registration point.
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Table 1.11: Effect of Insurance Coverage on Self-Reported Health (IV and Reduced-form)
 
Dependent variable:               happy or        healthy or       health has    depressed  hopeful         days in poor           days of poor 
                       very happy      very healthy       improved              mental health         physical health 
    (1)                    (2)          (3)       (4)       (5)   (6)        (7) 
 
Panel A: IV results 
 
Insured                     0.218**           0.137**       -0.011      -0.043    0.125** -0.684*     -0.259 
                      (0.101)         (0.060)       (0.097)      (0.036)    (0.052)  (0.371)               (0.902) 
 
Panel B: Reduced-from results 
 
Education           0.213***          0.136***          0.078                 0.016     0.049    0.094        0.084 
            (0.063)         (0.034)             (0.088)              (0.089)     (0.038)        (0.718)                  (0.711) 
Subsidy only           0.061         0.011              -0.034                 0.017               0.031                -0.047                   -0.038 
            (0.062)              (0.068)            (0.083)              (0.110)             (0.043)            (0.481)                   (0.578) 
Conve. regist.          -0.055                0.001              -0.121                 0.098              -0.061               0.381                     0.367 
            (0.091)              (0.066)            (0.087)              (0.138)             (0.044)            (0.879)                   (0.578) 
Educ & conve          -0.024                0.037               0.027                0.088               -0.002               0.376                     0.838 
           (0.081)         (0.061)            (0.078)              (0.071)             (0.057)            (0.586)                   (0.963)  
Subsidy & educ          0.337***           0.148***         0.306***          -0.138***         0.127***        -0.035       -0.038 
           (0.063)              (0.039)            (0.085)              (0.064)              (0.036)            (0.541)                   (0.578) 
Subsidy & conve         0.089                 0.001              -0.044                0.034                0.019               -0.730*      -0.736 
           (0.109)              (0.059)            (0.085)              (0.072)              (0.070)            (0.371)                   (0.751) 
Subsidy & educ & conve       0.325***           0.141***         0.066                -0.031                0.084**          -0.086       -0.419 
           (0.062)        (0.042)      (0.062)              (0.064)              (0.033)            (0.590)                   (0.777) 
 
Control mean         0.603        0.817             0.106      0.229     0.882   0.683                  1.665  
 
N         1335                 1335      1335                1335     1335              1335                  1335  
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All regression restricted to sample of household heads or adult members present at the time of survey. All regressions include individual-level and 
household/community-level covariates. Individual-level covariates are: age-group (<18 and 70+, 18-69 is omitted), gender, indicator for having a health 
condition, indicator for visiting a health facility at baseline, education status. Household/community-level covariates are: household wealth (poorest third and 
richest third, middle third omitted), household size, religion, ethnicity, distance to nearest health facility and distance to NHIS registration point.
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Chapter 2





Allocation of resources within a household is a subject of long-standing interest among
economists and policy makers. Previous research showing the lasting impact of early child-
hood conditions on later health and labor market outcomes highlights the significance of the
pattern of parental investment in early childhood (Almond and Currie, 2011; Royer, 2009;
Almond, 2006). From a Pareto-optimality standpoint, intrahousehold allocation provides
insights into whether household resources are being allocated efficiently (Berhman, 1997).
From a policy point of view, intrahousehold allocation may have a strong bearing on gen-
der and other forms of inequalities, and understanding of the underlying motivations could
inform appropriate design of transfer programs and other interventions to mitigate such in-
equalities. A growing body of recent empirical work has devoted attention to understanding
the process and nature of intrahousehold resource allocation. 1
This chapter contributes to this literature by seeking to understand allocation of health
resources among resource-constrained rural households. It presents analyses based on the
same experimental design to encourage take-up of Ghana’s social health insurance program,
the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), in the Wa West district of the Upper West
Region of Ghana described in detail in the first chapter. Intrahousehold allocation in this set-
ting without other forms of formal insurance is important because which member a resource-
constrained household insures has important implication for its ability to maintain its con-
sumption flow with realization of health risk. For instance, if a household insures its children
over its breadwinners, it might not be able to maintain its consumption in case of adverse
health shocks.
I study intrahousehold allocation using aspects of the subsidy intervention that randomly
1 See Almond & Mazumder (2013) for a review of the recent empirical literature.
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varied the ability of households to decide allocation of subsidies among its members. Specifi-
cally, households that did not recieve full subsidies under the subsidy intervention were given
two types of vouchers. One type of voucher assigned an amount to each household member
that could not be altered (specified voucher). The other type of voucher only assigned a to-
tal amount, allowing the household to decide the allocation among its members (unspecified
voucher). I compare enrollment rates within households across these two vouchers.
My results suggest that households prioritize children over other household members in
the presence of resource constraints. Households receiving 1/3 subsidy enrolled 15 percentage
points more children (under 17 years of age) compared to adults. Households who received
unspecified vouchers enrolled 20 percentage points fewer elderly people (70 years or more)
compared to adults. No such differences are found for households who received specified
vouchers or full subsidies. I present suggestive evidence to show that this pattern of allocation
cannot be explained by baseline differences in health history or differences in expected health.
Focussing on allocation among children, I find that among households given unspecified
vouchers enrollment of boys was 11.7 percentage points or 18% higher than girls. Here
again, this differential is not explained by differences in risky behaviors between boys and
girls, health history or expected future health. I provide additional evidence in support
of this pattern of allocation among children by showing that similar gender difference in
allocation of non-experimentally assigned mosquito bednets.
Previous literature has identified socio-cultural and economic factors behind gender bias
in allocation of resources in other contexts. In East Asia, for instance, persistent son prefer-
ence resulting from high dowry payments and patrilineal system of inheritance is commonly
cited as an explanation for gender differences in resource allocation (Das Gupta et al 2003).
Marriage in this setting involves bride price and not dowries. However, the inheritance sys-
tem is strictly patrilineal and could be an explanation for the gender differences in allocation.
On the other hand, I find suggestive evidence that labor market participation is a possible
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explanation for the differential enrollment in this setting. Among children aged 7-17 years
of age, labor market participaton is 5 percentage points higher for boys than girls at the
baseline and 3.5 percentage points higher at follow-up.
This chapter contributes to a growing literature studying intrahousehold allocation. One
strand of this literature has shown that control of resources and other assets within the
household affect allocation and expenditure patterns (Briado et al, 2012; Duflo and Udry,
2004; Duflo, 2003). This chapter is among the first to study intrahousehold allocation using
an experimental design. Ashraf (2009) and Kebede et al (2011) also use experimental designs
to study intrahousehold allocation decisions but they focus on the effect of information and
communication on spousal choices.2 The chapter also differs from existing studies in its focus
on health insurance.
The chapter is more closely related to the strand of the intrahousehold literature that
focus on parental allocation of resources among children and examine factors that account
for differential enrollment. A few studies have shown an association between parents’ charac-
teristics and their investment in children (Guryan et al, 2008; and Sayer et al, 2004). Recent
work has focused on whether parents invest in children to compensate for or reinforce early
life endowments (using birth weight and measures of IQ) and shocks to these endowments.
The vast majority of these studies find that parental investment tend to reinforce children’s
endowments (Adhvaryu and Nyshadham, 2012; Aizer and Cunha, 2012; Akresh et al, 2012;
Venkataramani, 2012; Datar et al, 2010; Almond et al, 2009) although a few studies find
evidence of compensating investment behavior (Del Bone et al, 2012; Bharadwaj et al, 2013;
Conti et al, 2012). The results presented in this chapter does not examine the relation-
2 A large part of this literature has focused on husband-wife allocations in unitary and non-cooperative
household models (Chiappori, 1997; Udry, 1996; Pitt et al, 1984).
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ship between resource allocation and early childhood endowments. Instead, it introduces an
exogenous variation in household resources while also varying the ability of households to
assign resources to learn about allocation among children.
Another strand of this literature finds gender differences in duration of breastfeeding,
childcare, parental time devoted to cognition-related inputs, vacccination rates and vita-
min supplementation (Baker and Milligan, 2013; Chen et al, 2013; Barcellos et al, 2011;
Jayachandran & Kuziemko, 2011).3 Parental preference for sons over daugthers has been
identified as an explanation for gender differences. This chapter contributes to this literature
by showing that differences in labor market participation could explain gender differences in
resource allocation. Moreover, I show this in a setting with no documented evidence of sex-
selection, overcoming empirical challenges the plaque studies from such settings (Barcellos
et al, 2011; Jensen, 2005)
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section two explains the experimental
design. Section three describes the data and empirical estimation procedure. Section four
presents the results and section five concludes the chapter.
2.2 Experimental Design
Chapter 1 (Sections 2 and 3) provides detailed description of the setting and the experimental
design. This section summarizes the aspect of the design relevant for the analysis presented
in this chapter.
3 Other studies have found no evidence of differential treatment by gender. Examples include Duflo
(2005) and Deaton (2003, 1997).
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The study was conducted in the Wa West district in the north-western part of Ghana. Wa
West is a poor and remote rural district located in the Savanna High Plains with a population
of about 81,000 in 2010. The economy is largely agrarian, dominated by subsistent farmers
who grow food crops such as maize, sorghum and vegetables. Latest estimates of household
incomes from the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS V) in 2006 indicates that per capita
income for a person living in a rural savannah locality, like Wa West, was GH¢232 or $252.80,
58% of the national average (GSS, 2008). The district is one of the most deprived in Ghana
with limited economic infrastracture and formal financial services. It also has one of the
lowest enrollment rates in the NHIS: baseline enrollment rate for the study sample was 21%.
The project introduced three interventions: a subsidy towards the payment of NHIS pre-
mium and fees, an education campaign and a convenience intervention as well as a complete
set of their interactions to encourage take up of NHIS. All interventions were randomized
at the community level but the subsidy level was then randomized at the household level.
Households were assigned to receive a full subsidy (GH¢12.20 or $8.13), subsidy worth 2/3
(GH¢8.10 or $5.40) or 1/3 (GH¢4 or $2.67) of insurance premiums and fees (See Figure 2.1).
In all cases, children (aged less than 18 years) and the elderly (aged 70 years or more) who
are exempt from premiums received an amount sufficient to pay for the full cost of enrolling
in the NHIS. Therefore the variation in subsidy level applies only to adult household mem-
bers. Subsidies were given in the form of vouchers with a two-month validity period and
redeemable only at the Wa West District Mutual Health Insurance Scheme. The voucher
specified names, ages and gender of all household members, expiration date and where it
should be redeemed.
Households not receiving full subsidy were informed about the extra amount needed
to register all members. To learn about intrahousehold allocation the vouchers for such
households took one of two forms. In one case, the voucher listed household members along
with the total amount of subsidy, allowing the household to allocate the amount among
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its members (henceforth, unspecified voucher). In the other case, the voucher specified an
amount against the name of each member and reallocation was not possible (henceforth,
specified voucher). Figure 2.2 presents an illustrative example. Adult members in the two
households in the top panel of the figure are both assigned to receive 2/3 subsidy. In the
top left panel, an amount is specified against the name of each household member (specified
voucher). In the top right panel, no amount is specified for each member but the total
subsidy for the household is specified (unspecified voucher). The value of the subsidy is the
same in this case because of the household size and age structure. Households in the bottom
panel received 1/3 subsidy.
Both the level of subsidy and voucher type were stratified by the broader treatment arms.
To avoid contamination from possible interactions among interventions, the main analyses
presented in this chapter is restricted to pure control households and households who received
the subsidy only intevention.
2.3 Data and Empirical Estimation
2.3.1 Data
The data used for the analysis comes from a household survey conducted as part of the ex-
perimental study. The sampling frame for the study was limited to communities with 30-400
residents that are at least 1km from the nearest other community. The size restriction was
informed by budgetary considerations because interventions were randomized at the commu-
nity level. The distance restriction was to minimize spillover of education and convenience
interventions to neighboring communities. All 61 communities meeting these criteria were
included and all households in these communities were interviewed.
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The baseline survey was conducted in September 2011. Interventions were implemented
in October 2011 with the follow-up survey in April 2012. The baseline survey collected
information on demographic characteristics, employment, health history, general health and
utilization of healthcare services, expected future health, enrollment in the NHIS and health
behaviors for all household members. Information on knowledge of health insurance was
collected from household heads or an adult respondent present if the household head was
absent. The follow-up survey successfully relocated almost 94% of individuals from the
baseline sample and collected similar information as the baseline.
In addition to the survey, the follow-up also collected administrative records of voucher
redemption from the Wa West DMHIS. These records include information on voucher re-
demption status, date(s) vouchers were redeemed, household members for whom vouchers
were applied in cases where all the members were not enrolled. This information is used
to cross-check survey information on subsidy take-up. The survey information matched
administrative records 97% of the time so the analysis is restricted to survey data.
Table 2.1 presents descriptive characteristics from the baseline survey and tests of balance
between treatments and control groups. The first column reports summary values for the full
sample. The baseline survey collected information on 4625 individuals from 680 households
in the 61 communities. The average household has 6.8 members, including 3.9 children under
18 years of age. The average age is 23 years. Forty-eight percent (48%) of individuals are
male and 80% of households are headed by males. Fifty-one percent (51%) of households
own a farmland and 59% own a mosquito net. Half of the households belong to the Dagaaba
ethnic group and about 43% are Christian. A third of all individuals have some formal
education.
In terms of health characteristics of the sample, 7% reported having a chronic health
condition lasting more than six months and 12% reported a sickness or injury in the last
four weeks. Utilization of formal healthcare is low even among those with illnesses. Only
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8.7% of all respondents (including 36% of those reporting illness or injury) visited a health
facility in the last four weeks. About 12.6% made a positive out-of-pocket health expendi-
ture. Among those reporting a positive expenditure, the average expenditure was GHC11.95
($6.64) over the four-week period. The average household lives within 5.36km of a health
facility and 18.43km from the district capital where registration for NHIS takes place. The
subjective probability of being sick over the next 12 months is 0.447. Eleven percent (11%)
of adults respondents (18 years and above) are current or past smokers and 53% had an
alcoholic beverage in the two weeks before the baseline survey. About 54% of individuals
reported sleeping under a mosquito net the night before the survey. Although 96% of adult
respondents had heard about the NHIS, on average, they answered less than 11 of 18 ques-
tions on knowledge of NHIS premiums levels, exemptions and benefits correctly. Enrollment
rate in the NHIS is 21% but 37% of individuals had registered with the scheme once before.
The re-enrollment rate is 63%.
The remaining columns of Table 2.1 present a balance test between the control group and
subsidy treatments by level of subsidy and voucher type. All tests are pairwise comparisons
between each treatment and the control group that adjust standard errors for intra-cluster
(intra-community) correlation. The table shows a good balance between treatments and con-
trol groups. Although there are some statistically significant differences for some variables,
the magnitude of differences are small and the number of such significant differences is not
very different from what would be expected by chance for the number comparisons.
2.3.2 Estimation
I estimate the effects of voucher type on allocation of subsidies within households by ordinary
least squares estimation of the following equation:
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enrolledihc = ρ+ β1specifiedhc + β2unspecifiedhc + β3fullhc +Xihcθ + Zhcδ +Wihcγ
(specifiedhc ∗Wihc)α1 + (unspecifiedhc ∗Wihc)α2 + (fullhc ∗Wihc)α3 + Vcω + εihc (2.1)
where i denotes an individual, h denotes a household and c denotes a community and
enrolledihc refers to an indicator that an individual is enrolled in the NHIS at follow-up.
specifiedhc, unspecifiedhc and fullhc indicate assignment to specified, unspecified vouchers and
full subsidy respectively. Xihc denote a set of individual-level covariates (indicator for having
some formal education, indicator for having a health condition at baseline, indicator for
visiting a health facility at baseline and indicator for having ever registered with the NHIS).
Zhc and Vc denote household-level covariates (household size, religion, ethnicity, wealth)
and community-level covariates (distance to nearest health facility, distance to the district
capital) respectively. Wihc refers to a vector of individual-level characteristics that identify
the individual’s position in the household (relationship to the head of the household, gender
and age grouping: under 18, 18-69 or 70+). a1, a2and a3are vectors whose elements denote
the effect of assignment to specified voucher, unspecified voucher and full subsidy respectively
on the elements of the vector Wihc. In all estimations standard errors are clustered at the
community level.
2.4 Results
I begin by showing the effect of voucher type received on enrollment rates. Figure 2.3 presents
enrollment rates by voucher type at baseline and follow-up. As expected the enrollment rate
is higher among full subsidy recipients compared to recipients of specified or unspecified
vouchers (less than full subsidy). Enrollment is also higher among households with unspec-
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ified than specified vouchers. Column 1 of Table 2.2 regresses the fraction of household
members enrolled on subsidy level after controlling for receipt of education and convenience
interventions. As expected, the fraction of household members enrolled is increasing in the
level of subsidy. Column 2 shows that the enrollment rate is higher in unspecified voucher
households than in specified voucher households. This may have resulted from unspecified
voucher households adding up to the subsidy to enroll more members or taking advantage
of the flexibility of the voucher to use up the total amount of subsidy. Column 4 probes
this by regressing the average amount households spent to enroll its members on voucher
type received. Since children and the elderly pay less to enroll in the NHIS, I control for
the fraction of children and elderly in the household. The results show that unspecified
voucher households did not spend more on average to enroll its members, suggesting that
they probably took advantage of the flexibility of the voucher to enroll more members.
The remaining columns of Table 2.2 focus on the fraction of children enrolled. Column
5 shows that child enrollment is increasing in the level of subsidy. The fraction of children
enrolled is highest with unspecified subsidy and lowest with specified voucher (column 6).
The last four columns present results separately for boys and girls. Enrollment rates are
similar under full subsidies but lower for girls otherwise. A comparison of columns 8 and
10 shows that this difference is mainly from households receiving unspecified vouchers as
enrollment rate is similar when voucher is the specified type.
Next, I examine allocation within households more explicitly. Table 2.3 shows the effect
of subsidy levels (column 1) and voucher type (column 2) on enrollment across three age
groups: less than 18 years (children), 18-69 years (adults) and 70 years and above (elderly).
These age groups are chosen based on the pricing regime under NHIS. Column 1 shows that
among recipients of 1/3 subsidy enrollment of children is 14.7 percentage points higher than
other age groups but there is no statistically significant difference in enrollment rates of adults
and elderly. There are no differences across age groups when households receive either 2/3 or
59
full subsidy. Column 2 shows enrollment by voucher type. Households enroll 13.3 percentage
points more children than adults when given specified vouchers but this difference vanishes
with unspecified vouchers. There is no significant difference between enrollment rates of
adults and the elderly when voucher is specified or full subsidy but enrollment of the elderly
falls by 20 percentage points with unspecified subsidy.
The results in Table 2.3 suggest that households prioritize children when subsidy is not
enough to enroll every member. When such households are given the option to decide
allocation, they enroll a lower proportion of the elderly. Panel A of Table 2.4 investigates
whether this allocation pattern may be explained by differences in baseline health conditions
or expected health. The health conditions reported here are i) indicator that an individual
reported an injury in the last two weeks, ii) an indicator that individual reported an illness
in the last two weeks, iii) an indicator that an individual has a health condition lasting
more than 6 months, and iv) an indicator that an individual is expected to be sick over
the next 12 months. Columns 1-3 shows that current health conditions cannot explain the
allocation patterns documented in Table 2.3. Although children reported better and the
elderly reported worse health conditions than adults, enrollment of children is higher than
other age groups. Column 4 shows that both children and the elderly are expected to be in
worse health than adults. While the higher expected incidence of ill health among children is
consistent with their higher enrollment rate, the lower enrollment of elderly is not consistent
with their higher incidence of expected ill health. Taken together, the results in Panel A of
Table 2.4 cannot explain within household enrollment by age.
Figure 2.4 shows enrollment rates among members of the household - fathers, mothers,
male child, female child and other relatives - by type of voucher. The “other relatives”
category refers to parents of the head or spouse, brothers/sisters, cousin and other extended
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family members.4 The figure is restricted to households in which all 5 categories of household
members are present. As expected, the fraction of each category of household members
enrolled is not higher with specified/unspecified voucher than with full subsidy. Overall
enrollment rate is highest for male children. A comparison of specified versus unspecified
vouchers shows that with the exception of female children, enrollment rates are higher under
unspecified than specified although the differences are not statistically significant. Moreover,
for children, enrollment is identical under specified voucher but increases marginally for males
and falls for females with unspecified voucher.
Table 2.5 presents the corresponding regression results. Father is the omitted category
of household members. The interaction between voucher type and status in the household
identifies the effect of voucher type on allocation within the household. Column 1 reports
regression without other covariates while column 2 includes a full set of covariates. Within
households, enrollment rates is highest among male children and lowest among other rela-
tives. There are no significant differences in enrollment rates among various members for
full subsidy households. For households receiving specified vouchers, enrollment of children
is higher than other household members and there is no significant difference between boys
and girls. For households receiving unspecified voucher however, enrollment of girls is 13.3
percentage points lower than fathers and 14.5 percentage points lower than boys. These
differences are statistically significant at 10% level.5
4 I have repeated this analysis by further disaggregating other relatives by age, gender and baseline health
status. The results are not reported here due to statistical power issues arising from the disaggregations.
5 I have also repeated this analysis by comparing allocations between Christian and non-Christian religions
and the results are similar to those reported here but with weaker statistical power.
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The remainder of this section focuses on allocation among children. Enrollment of chil-
dren is of special interest because children are a highly vulnerable sub-population. Moreover,
a growing body of work has shown that health conditions in early life have lasting impact
on human capital accumulation (Almond and Currie, 2011).
Figure 2.5 shows enrollment of children by level of subsidy (left panel) and by voucher
type (right panel). Enrollment rate is higher for boys when households receive less than
full subsidy. The right panel shows that this difference is from from households receiving
unspecified vouchers: enrollment rates are nearly identical with specified vouchers or full
subsidy voucher and about 10 percentage points lower for girls when households receive
unspecified vouchers. Table 2.6 presents the corresponding regression results. Columns 1
and 2 present enrollment by subsidy levels and columns 3-4 by voucher type. Among less than
full subsidy households, enrollment rate of boys is 6.9 and 10.8 percentage higher than girls
if subsidy levels are 1/3 and 2/3 respectively. This differential vanishes with full subsidy.
Column 4 confirms that this differential is mainly from households receiving unspecified
vouchers. The enrollment rate is similar between boys and girls among specified voucher
households but 11.7 percentage points (17.7%) higher for boys among unspecified voucher
households.
Next, I show that this pattern of allocation is found in other (not experimentally allo-
cated) health resources. Table 2.7 presents regression results with an indicator for sleeping
under a mosquito net as the outcome variable at both baseline and follow-up. The table
shows that allocation of mosquito nets favor boys. Boys are 9.5 percentage points more likely
to report sleeping under a mosquito net the night before the baseline survey compared to
girls. The corresponding estimate for the follow-up is 6.4.
The results in the preceding paragraphs show that household prioritize boys over girls in
the allocation of resources. However, it is possible that households are making allocations
based on other child characteristics that may be correlated with gender. For instance, boys
62
may be engaging in more risky behavior and households could be responding by optimally
enrolling more boys. It is also possible that boys are less healthy in general. Panel B of
Table 2.4 compares indicators of risky behavior and current and expected health of children
at baseline by gender. To the extent that the incidence of injuries reflects risky behavior,
column 1 finds no evidence that boys engage in more risky behavior than girls. The remaining
columns also find no evidence that boys suffer more illness, have higher incidence of chronic
health conditions or are expected to less healthy than girls. Overall, these results suggest
that health conditions and expected health at baseline do not explain the gender difference
in allocation of subsidies among children.
Previous literature has identified socio-cultural and economic factors as common reasons
for parental allocation of resources in favor of boys (Das Gupta et al, 2003). Cultural
factors include rigid patrilineal inheritance lineages and economic factors include old age
insurance, male labor force participation and presence of substantial dowries for females.
Marriage customs in this setting do not involve dowries but the inheritance system is strictly
patrilineal and could be a potential explanation of the allocation patterns among children.
There is also anecdotal evidence that old age insurance could be an explanation for the higher
investment in boys. In informal conversations, several residents of the districts mentioned
that importance of males staying at home and helping out on farms. Female migration to
the south is very common in this setting.
Another potential explanation for the gender differrences in this predominantly rural
agricultural setting where subsistent farmers rely on family labor for farm production is
labor market participation. Indeed, Table 2.8 presents evidence consistent with a labor
market participation as the motive for the differential insurance enrollment by gender. I
regress an indicator that a child aged 7-17 years worked on family farm or for wage on
gender and other covariates. The results show that boys have 3.6 percentage points higher
probability of working compared to girls.
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2.5 Conclusion
Intrahousehold allocation of resources in resource-constrained household have important
long-term implications for human capital formation and policy design. This chapter sought
to learn about allocation of health resources among rural household in Ghana. It uses an
experimental design that randomly gave households in a rural district different levels of sub-
sidies to enroll in Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme. The design varied the ability
of households to determine allocation of subsidies in cases where subsidies were not enough
to enroll all members of the household.
The results suggest that households prioritize children in the allocation when resources
are not sufficient to enroll every household member. Such households also enroll a lower
fraction of the elderly (70 years or older) in favor of adults (18-69) when given the option to
decide allocation of resources even though the cost of enrolling the latter is three times the
cost of enrolling the former. Focusing on allocation among children, I find that households
given unspecified vouchers enroll more boys than girls. This pattern of allocation among
children is also found in distribution of bednets within household. I present suggestive
evidence that this allocation pattern cannot be explained by differences in risky behaviors,
health history or expected future health.
Previous studies identify socio-cultural and economic factors as common reasons for gen-
der differences in allocation of resources among children. Unlike other settings, son preference
is not a likely explanation for the gender difference reported in this chapter. While I cannot
rule out socio-cultural factors such as patrilineal inheritance as explanation of the allocation
patterns in this setting, I find suggestive evidence that differential labor market participation
rates between girls and boys could be an explanation. Further research is needed to identify
the exact causes of gender differences in allocation of resources to inform appropriate policy
response.
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Figure 2.2: Sample Subsidy Voucher
REDEEM AT WA WEST DISTRICT NHIS
SEND - GHANA
valid until :23/12/2011
Subsidy voucher for NHIS
NAME AGE GENDER   AMOUNT
REDEEM AT WA WEST DISTRICT NHIS
SEND - GHANA
valid until :23/12/2011
Subsidy voucher for NHIS
NAME AGE GENDER    AMOUNT
REDEEM AT WA WEST DISTRICT NHIS
SEND - GHANA
valid until :23/12/2011
Subsidy voucher for NHIS
NAME AGE GENDER   AMOUNT
REDEEM AT WA WEST DISTRICT NHIS
SEND - GHANA
valid until :23/12/2011
Subsidy voucher for NHIS
NAME AGE GENDER   AMOUNT
Community: Kapru        
I
Asamoah Gyan                          48     M        8.1
Adwoa                                        41     F         8.1 
Felicia                                        16      F         4
Kwame                                      12      M        4
Akosua                                       79     F         4
Antuo Brimah                                66       M     
Rianatu                                         61        F
Chorayele                                     21       M
Iddrisu                                          19        M
Total amount for this  household: GHC 16.00
Community: Kapru
Ibrahim Yahya                             50     M             
Fatima                                         40      F           
Fuseina                                       16      F           
Iddrisu                                         13      M           
Bukari                                          11      M          
Total amount for this household: GHC 28.20
Community: Kapru
Shilla Alhassan                           37     M        4
Maamuna                                   35      F        4
Yakubu                                        9       M        4
Abdul                                          4       M        4
Community: Kapru
Notes: Households in top panels receive 2/3 subsidy; those in the bottom panels receive 1/3 subsidy. Left
panels receive specified vouchers; right panels receive unspecified vouchers. Total amount required to enroll
in NHIS in Wa West District are GHC4 for children (less than 18 years), GHC12.20 for adults (aged 18-69)
and GHC4 for elderly (70 years or more). Children and the elderly always receive GHC4 with specified
voucher. $1=1.5GHC.
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control specified unspecified full
baseline 95% CI
follow-up 95% CI
Notes: Figure is based on subsample of subsidy only and pure control households (N=2022)



















control specified unspecified full
father mother
boy girl
other relative 95% CI
Notes: Figure restricted to subsample of subsidy only and pure control households with mothers, fathers,
at least one child and another household member (N=1989)
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control one-third two-thirds full
male 95% CI
female 95% CI



















control specified unspecified full
male 95% CI
female 95% CI
enrollment by voucher type
Notes: Figure restricted to subsample of 1121 children under 18 years of age from subsidy only and pure
control.
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Table 2.1: Balance Between Treatments and Control Groups
 
    Control    1/3 subsidy     2/3 subsidy   full subsidy   specified  unspecified 
    Mean       minus             minus        minus           minus           minus 
          control           control       control         control         control 
 
Number of individuals   1313      476  559      983             551       484  
Age     24.313     -1.696 0.399      1.458         -1.326            1.304 
Male     0.476       -0.015    0.012     -0.021         0.012            -0.018 
Has some formal education  0.337     0.005 0.001     -0.015         0.013      -0.019 
Has a health condition                0.072       -0.015           -0.014     -0.006        -0.012            -0.019 
Has been ill in the last month      0.109     -0.049           -0.031        -0.019        -0.056*      -0.038 
Has visited health facility  0.085      0.033           -0.019      0.004         -0.015      -0.023 
Made out of pocket expense        0.133     -0.004           -0.049      0.015         -0.037      -0.047 
Health expend. in last month       13.07       0.614           -0.638      0.884         -0.447        0.689 
Probably will be sick next year    0.468     -0.006 0.018      0.041         -0.011       0.034 
Heard of the NHIS   0.958      0.002 0.001     -0.002        -0.003       0.004 
Knowledge of NHIS                   10.576      -0.089           -0.412         0.130        -0.229             0.221 
Ever enrolled in NHIS    0.338     0.139*          -0.056     -0.077        -0.061            -0.082 
Currently enrolled in NHIS   0.201     -0.057           -0.040      0.042         -0.036      -0.033  
Re-enrolled in NHIS   0.700      0.106 0.020      0.172**      0.055       0.066 
Ever smoked    0.117     -0.001 0.057**    -0.001         0.028       0.016 
Drank alcohol in last 2 weeks  0.524      0.028 0.027     -0.013        -0.025       0.101 
Slept under mosquito net    0.452     -0.108            -0.105     -0.008        -0.172*          -0.022 
 
Christian    0.422       -0.133           -0.110     -0.076        -0.143            -0.057 
Dagaaba                0.438       -0.158           -0.140      0.025        -0.203**      -0.030 
Household size    6.944        0.271           -0.081        -0.567         0.067             -0.042 
Number of children under 18  3.697     -0.055          -0.162     -0.699        -0.032            -0.270  
Head is male    0.808        0.037           -0.049     -0.048        -0.014      -0.034 
Owns farming land   0.480     -0.102          -0.052     -0.107        -0.052            -0.102 
Owns a mosquito net   0.544       -0.141          -0.209**    -0.096         -0.199**      -0.109  
Distance to NHIS regist. (km)  21.286     -3.122          -1.659      4.601         -3.031      -1.885  
Distance to health fac. (km)  5.501        0.046           0.096          0.573          0.567       0.909 
 
Notes: *, ** and *** refers to statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All tests of differences adjust 
standard errors for intra-cluster correlation ie intra-community/village correlation. Specified refers to households receiving 1/3 or 
2/3 subsidy with specified amount assigned for each household member. Unspecified refers to households receiving 1/3 or 2/3 
subsidy with no specified amount for each household member and therefore household could decide how to allocate subsidy 
among its members. Dagaaba refers to an ethnic group.
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Table 2.2: Effect of Subsidy Level and Voucher Type on Enrollment Rates
 
Dependent variable:   fraction of HH             per capita amount         fraction of children        fraction of boys                  fraction of girls 
    members enrolled        spent on NHIS regis      enrolled              enrolled                                enrolled 
                               (1)        (2)      (3)        (4)  (5)        (6)  (7)         (8)  (9)         (10) 
 
1/3 Subsidy              0.269***                 -1.873*          0.277***      0.294***  0.223**       
              (0.052)                    (0.980)   (0.068)   (0.086)   (0.088) 
2/3 subsidy             0.359***                 -4.065***  0.332***  0.384***  0.304*** 
              (0.050)                    (1.727)   (0.064)   (0.069)   (0.083) 
Full subsidy             0.386***     0.386***   -6.368***   -6.368*** 0.376***    0.376*** 0.391***    0.391*** 0.405***    0.405*** 
              (0.058)       (0.058)       (1.402)      (1.402) (0.059)       (0.049) (0.060)       (0.060) (0.071)       (0.070) 
Education              0.139**       0.088*        1.572*      1.911** 0.067       0.065 0.031       0.034 0.026          0.029 
              (0.061)       (0.051)       (0.943)      (0.906) (0.065)       (0.064) (0.066)       (0.066) (0.082)       (0.081) 
Conve regist. `           0.002       -0.003         1.518      1.222 -0.024       -0.018 -0.009      -0.006 -0.024         -0.016 
              (0.053)       (0.054)       (1.141)      (1.15) (0.057)       (0.057) (0.068)       (0.069) (0.062)        (0.063) 
1/3 or 2/3 specified        0.283***       -3.366*        0.307***         0.306***         0.309** 
          (0.053)       (1.689)        (0.069)        (0.074)         (0.089) 
1/3 or 2/3 unspecified        0.34 1***       -2.539*        0.407***        0.452***                         0.231** 
          (0.057)       (1.402)        (0.074)        (0.086)         (0.090) 
 
N    638        638 638       638   576        576   488       488   476         476 
 F-statistic   29.13        33.23 6.45       5.24  22.58        22.41   16.58       15.93  17.56         16.96 
R2    0.2882        0.2907 0.0416        0.0425  0.2587        0.0433   0.2633       0.2622  0.2399         0.2427 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, *** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. Per capita amount spent on NHIS registration is defined as the total amount household spent to enroll members in NHIS divided by the total number 
of household members enrolled. All regressions include the following covariates: the household head’s age and its square, his/her religion and ethnicity and 
education status, household wealth index, indicator that a household member has chronic condition, distance to the NHIS registration center and nearest health 
facility. In addition to these covariates, columns 1 and 2 include number of children under 18 years.
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Table 2.3: Intrahousehold Allocation by Age Group
 
Dependent variable: indicator = 0 for not enrolled, 1 for enrolled 
(1)                         (2)   
 
1/3 Subsidy     0.314***   
     (0.075)      
2/3 subsidy    0.466***     
     (0.060)      
Full subsidy    0.517***  0.496*** 
     (0.058)   (0.068) 
Aged ≤17 years    0.080**  0.080** 
     (0.030)   (0.030)   
Aged ≥70 years    -0.052*   -0.052   
     (0.050)   (0.050)   
Aged ≤17 years*1/3 subsidy  0.147*      
     (0.078)   
Aged ≥70 years * 1/3 subsidy  0.034   
     (0.069)   
Aged ≤17 years*2/3 subsidy  0.007    
     (0.044)   
Aged ≥70 years * 2/3 subsidy              -0.047   
     (0.103)   
Aged ≤17 years*full subsidy  0.015   0.015  
     (0.037)   (0.037) 
Aged ≥70 years * full subsidy  -0.061              -0.061 
     (0.081)   (0.081) 
Amounts specified      0.343***  
        (0.066)  
Amounts unspecified      0.550***  
        (0.075)  
Aged ≤17 years* specified     0.133*    
        (0.075)    
Aged ≥70 years * specified     0.036    
        (0.051)    
Aged ≤17 years* unspecified     0.007    
        (0.070)    
Aged ≥70 years * unspecified                 -0.199*    
        (0.109)    
 
N     2022   2022  
Adj. R2    0.3096   0.3109 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at community level reported in brackets. *, *** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 10 and 1% levels respectively. Age group 18-69 is the omitted category for age group variable. 
1/3 subsidy and 2/3 subsidies refers to households receiving amount that pays for 1/3 and 2/3 of the cost of enrolling 
in insurance. All regressions include controls for gender, religion, ethnicity, distance to the insurance registration 
center and distance to the nearest health facility. 
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Table 2.4: Current and Expected Health at Baseline (full sample and children)
 
Dependent var:    injured in    illness in      has chronic        expects to 
       last two    last two              health                           be ill next 
       weeks            weeks                condition         year 
 
      Panel A: Full sample 
 
age<18   -0.004**    -0.027***       -0.074***        0.047*** 
    (0.002)    (0.009)       (0.008)        (0.013) 
age>69    0.000     0.039*       0.157***        0.086*** 
    (0.001)    (0.023)               (0.028)        (0.028) 
 
N     4313      4313       4313         4313 
 
     Panel B: Children(gender)  
 
male      0.002              0.013      0.004        -0.001 
     (0.002)   (0.008)      (0.005)        (0.013) 
 
N     2309     2309        2309         2309 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, *** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Sample for regressions are restricted to baseline sample of
children under 18 years of age. All regressions include the following covariates: age, mother's education status, 
household wealth (poorest third and richest third, middle third omitted), household size, religion, ethnicity, distance 
to nearest health facility and distance to NHIS registration point. In panel A, the omitted category is adults (age 18-
69).
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Table 2.5: Allocation Within Households by Voucher Type
 
Dependent variable: indicator = 0 for not enrolled, 1 for enrolled 
 (1)                     (2)  
 
Specified     0.360*** 0.326***   
      (0.075)  (0.061)   
Unspecifed     0.481*** 0.534***  
      (0.083)  (0.072)   
Full subsidy     0.449*** 0.484***  
      (0.084)  (0.089)   
mother       0.009  -0.017  
      (0.032)  (0.054)   
boy child      0.078*  0.098** 
      (0.041)  (0.048) 
girl child      0.028  -0.016    
      (0.057)  (0.061) 
Other  relative     -0.077*  -0.086*   
      (0.040)  (0.046)   
mother *  specified    0.016   0.008     
      (0.082)  (0.071)     
boy child  * specified    0.158*   0.121**    
      (0.083)  (0.067)     
girl child  * specified    0.153*  0.132*     
      (0.089)  (0.076)     
Other relative * specified   -0.033   0.007  
      (0.086)  (0.099)  
mother * unspecified    -0.028  -0.043     
      (0.056)  (0.050)     
boy child * unspecified    0.056  0.015     
      (0.057)  (0.050)  
girl child * unspecified    -0.097*  -0.133*     
      (0.057)  (0.073)     
Other relative * unspecified   -0.007  0.003     
      (0.105)  (0.103)     
mother * full subsidy    -0.000  -0.016     
      (0.076)  (0.070)     
boy child * full subsidy    0.074   0.051     
      (0.062)  (0.060)    
girl child * full subsidy    0.045  0.033     
      (0.062)  (0.059)     
Other relative * full subsidy   0.025  0.004     
      (0.094)  (0.094)     
 
Other covariates      X 
N      2022  2022   
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Sample restricted to subsidy only and pure control households. 
Specified refers to less than full subsidy voucher that specifies subsidy amount for each household member. 
Unspecified refers to less than full subsidy voucher which allows household to decide the allocation among its 
members. Column 2 include a full set of covariates. 
72
Table 2.6: Child Enrollment by Gender
 
Dependent variable:  Indicator =1 for enrolled; = 0 for not enrolled 
(1)   (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
1/3 subsidy    0.311*** 0.214**    
    (0.098)  (0.096)    
2/3 subsidy   0.343*** 0.283***     
    (0.056)  (0.052)    
Full subsidy   0.372*** 0.359*** 0.372*** 0.359*** 
    (0.065)  (0.063)  (0.065)  (0.063) 
1/3 subsidy * male   0.057  0.069*   
    (0.041)  (0.036)      
2/3 subsidy * male  0.083*  0.108*   
    (0.045)  (0.046)      
Full subsidy * male  -0.028  -0.022  -0.018  -0.021 
    (0.048)  (0.043)  (0.049)  (0.050) 
Male    0.002  -0.003  0.002  -0.003  
    (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
1/3 or 2/3 specified       0.307*** 0.221*** 
        (0.070)  (0.071) 
1/3 or 2/3 unspecified      0.405*** 0.377*** 
        (0.079)  (0.077) 
1/3 or 2/3 specified * male      0.001  0.007 
        (0.039)  (0.043)  
1/3 or 2/3 unspecified * male     0.103*  0.117** 
        (0.054)  (0.055) 
 
Other covariates    X    X 
N    1121  1121  1121  1121 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 1/3 or 2/3 specified refers to less than full subsidy voucher that 
specifies subsidy amount for each household member. 1/3 or 2/3 unspecified refers to less than full subsidy voucher 
which allows household to decide the allocation among its members. Sample for all regressions restricted to children 
aged under 18 years from subsidy only and pure control households. Other covariates include both individual-level 
and household/community-level variables. Individual-level covariates are: indicator for having a health condition, 
indicator for visiting a health facility at baseline, education status. Household/community-level covariates are: 
household wealth (poorest third and richest third, middle third omitted), household size, religion, ethnicity, distance 
to nearest health facility and distance to NHIS registration point. 
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Table 2.7: Allocation of Mosquito Nets Among Children
 
Dependent variable:  Indicator for slept under a mosquito net last night 
           Baseline        Follow-up 
(1)   (2)   (3)  (4) 
 
Male     0.102*** 0.095***  0.076** 0.064** 
    (0.031)  (0.027)   (0.029)  (0.028) 
 
Covariates     X     X 
 
N    2108  2108   2031  2031 
F-statistic   10.61  14.51   6.70  4.14 
R2    0.0105  0.0940   0.0059  0.0729 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, *** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Sample for regressions are restricted to children under 18 years. 
Table 2.8: Children’s Labor Market Participation
 
  Dependent variable:  Indicator =1 worked last week; = 0 for did not work 
 (1)   (2)   
 
Male     0.037*   0.036** 
     (0.020)  (0.017) 
 
Other covariates     X   
N     2125  2125   
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Sample for regressions is restricted to children aged 7-18 years. 
Other covariates include both individual-level and household/community-level variables. Individual-level covariates
are: indicator for having a health condition, indicator for visiting a health facility at baseline, education status. 
Household/community-level covariates are: household wealth (poorest third and richest third, middle third omitted), 
household size, religion, ethnicity, distance to nearest health facility and distance to NHIS registration point. 
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Chapter 3
Fertility Behavior of Various
Socio-Economic Groups in Response
to the Introduction of Reproductive
and Family Planning Services in
Rural Africa: Longitudinal Evidence




The relationship between socio-economic status and fertility is a subject of long-standing
research interest among economists and other social scientists. Following seminal work of
Becker and Lewis (1973), a number of empirical studies have demonstrated that family size
has negative effect on socio-economic outcomes of children (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980;
Gruber et al, 1999; Donohue et al, 2002; Charles and Stephens, 2006; Pop-Eleches, 2006).
However, recent studies from developed countries fail to find any causal effect of family size
on socio-economic status (Black et al, 2005; Angrist et al, 2006; Aaslund and Gronquist,
2007). Another body of work has sought to shed light on the effect of socio-economic status
on fertility outcomes, mostly showing a negative gradient (Gertler and Molyneaux1994;
Bongaarts, 2003; Breierova and Duflo, 2004; Dust, 2005; Al Kandari, 2007; Schellekens,
2009; Kim, 2010; Pop-Eleches, 2010; Brand and Davis, 2011; Dribe and Scalone, 2011).
This chapter seeks to explore how the quasi-experimental introduction of reproductive
and family planning services affect the fertility behavior of different socio-economic groups
in a rural African setting. The chapter combines a rich longitudinal data with quasi-
experimental introduction of reproductive and family planning interventions in the Kassena-
Nankana districts of northern Ghana to show how women of different socio-economic status
respond to such interventions. We follow 24204 women who were of reproductive age (15-49
years) in 1993 for 18 years. We document the association between socio-economic status,
measured by women’s education status, her husband’s education status and wealth status,
and fertility preferences, regulation and outcomes before the introduction of the reproductive
health interventions. We then investigate how the responses to the interventions differed by
socio-economic status.
Most existing studies on the fertility-socio-economic status gradient focus on the role
of educational attainment of women. The existence of a strong negative gradient has been
76
used as a basis for promoting female education as a tool for fertility reduction in many
developing countries (Cochrane, 1979; Jeejeboy, 1992). However, in settings where social
and cultural traditions emphasize male dominance in marriages, the effectiveness of such
policies may be uncertain. For instance, in Sub-Saharan Africa the predominance of marriage
and reproductive customs and norms that accentuate the dominance of men in reproductive
decision-making within the family may render female education a less effective strategy for
reducing fertility (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987, 1988 and 1990). In such settings husband’s
education may be as strong a predictor of fertility as a woman’s education.
We find that at baseline educated women did not have significantly fewer children, but
desired lower family sizes and were more likely to use modern contraceptives. However,
husband’s education was associated with lower fertility especially when their wives were
also educated. Wealth was associated with higher fertility. Moreover, controlling for wealth
does not affect the effect of education on fertility. We find that the reproductive health
interventions affected both educated and uneducated women but the effect on educated
women was stronger, leading to the emergence of an education-fertility differential 16 years
after the introduction of the interventions. Furthermore, our results show that this fertility
differential by women’s education status is concentrated in women with educated husbands.
Our results highlight the importance of men in reproductive decision in settings like ours.
Marriage arrangements in this setting is characterized by customs and traditions that severely
restrict the autonomy of women and emphasize male dominance in reproductive decision-
making. For instance, married women who adopt contraception without the consent of their
husbands face punishments that could be as severe as being ostracized from their communities
(Debpuur et al, 2002). Our findings demonstrates that in such settings, education of men
has an equally important, if not more important role in fertility control.
The chapter makes two main contributions to the literature on relationship between
socio-economic economic status and fertility. Firstly, we use more diverse measures of socio-
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economic status. Gertler and Molyneax (1994), Dust (2005) and Al Kandari (2007) also use
both income/wealth and educational attainment in their study but none of them attempt
to assess the relative effects of women’s and men’s educational attainment on fertility. To
the best of our knowledge, Breierova and Duflo (2004) is the only other paper that explicitly
use men’s and women’s education to understand fertility behavior in Indonesia. They find
that female education is a stronger determinant of age at marriage and early fertility than
male education. Secondly, we also use a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the cost
of contraception to study fertility behavior.
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section describes the context of the study
and the nature of reproductive interventions that were introduced. Section three describes
the data and analytical methods employed. Results are presented in section 4. Section 5
presents concluding discussions of the results.
3.2 Setting
The setting is the Kassena-Nankana districts1 of the Upper East Region of Ghana, two
impoverished rural districts located on the North-eastern corner of Ghana. Until recently,
the highly dispersed settlement patterns and limited access to modern communication left
these remote districts largely isolated from the outside world. Illiteracy rates are high and
access to formal health care services is limited access. Pervasive animist religious practices
and traditional forms of social organization and cultural traditions that limits the autonomy
of women and emphasize the dominance of men in decision-making process contributed to
high fertility rates in the area (Debpuur, et al. 2002).
In the mid-1990s, the Navrongo Community Health and Family Planning Project (CHFP)
was launched in the district to test the hypothesis that family planning services can induce
1The Kassena-Nankana District was split into Kassena-Nankana East and West in 2008
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sustained reproductive change in a traditional rural African population (Binka et al 1995).
The CHFP employed a quasi-randomized design that assigned treatments to different parts
of the district called treatment cells.2 One cell (CHO) received a community health nurse
who provided doorstep family planning and ambulatory services. A broad of range of family
planning and reproductive health services were provided under this intervention. These
include oral contraceptives and condoms, and injectable contraceptives as well as treatment
of common ailments and immunization. This intervention also included scheduled visits by
nurses to all compounds within an assigned catchment area in 90-day cycles to provide these
services although this requirement was not strictly regulated (Debpuur et al 2002). In another
cell (YZ), existing traditional social and political structures were mobilized in support of
community health and family planning services. Known as the zurugelu (togetherness), it
involved constituting health action committees from existing social-political structures and
mobilizing traditional peer networks to provide outreach to men. A third cell received both
interventions (CHO+YZ) while a forth cell was designated a control cell.
To monitor the impact of the project, a district-wide longitudinal health and demo-
graphic surveillance system (HDSS) was put in place to provide basic indicators of interest,
particularly fertility and mortality indictors. The HDSS was instituted in 1993 to serve as
the bedrock of research by the Navrongo Health Research Center (NHRC) into mortality,
morbidity and other health issues in the Kassena-Nankana districts. The districts currently
have a total population of about 150,000 individuals under continuous monitoring. Data
from this HDSS shows substantial reduction fertility in response to the CHFP project: to-
tal fertility rates fell by over 1.2 births in just fifteen years after the launch of the project
(Philips et al 2012).




The data resources for this paper are from the Navrongo Health and Demographic Surveil-
lance System (HDSS). Over the last 20 years, the HDSS has collected information on births,
deaths, relationships and migration and other demographic information on all residents of
the two Kassena-Nankana districts that provides a unique platform for monitoring health
and demographic change over time. The HDSS also includes an annual update of educational
attainment, immunization and frequent updates of compound belongings.3 In addition, the
NHRC conducted an open-cohort panel survey of over 5,000 women (henceforth Panel) drawn
from approximately 1,900 randomly sampled compounds from the HDSS database that in-
volves all married women of reproductive age and their co-resident husbands. For more than
10 years (1993-2003), these women were surveyed annually to assess their reproductive be-
havior and preferences, contraceptive use and fertility determinants, as well as indicators of
health seeking behavior. In 1999, a socio-economic survey that collects detailed information
about household assets, sources of drinking water, and materials for the construction of their
homes was added to the Panel survey.
The information from these two data resources is complementary for the current analyses.
The continuous updating system of the HDSS provides accurate information about women’s
total live births and surviving children, in addition to basic demographic information. It
also contains information on educational and wealth for measuring relationship between
fertility and socio-economic status before and during the demographic transition in our
setting. Though the HDSS contains essential information over an extended period for the
3 A compound is composed of one or more households. Prior to 2004, assets information was collected at
the compound level. Since 2004 these have been collected at the household level.
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entire population, it contains no information about fertility preferences and regulations that
may explain fertility outcomes during demographic transition. By contrast, the Panel, while
shorter in terms of duration, contains detailed annual information on fertility preferences
and contraceptive use. We use the Panel mainly for our analyses of fertility regulation and
preferences.
3.3.2 Empirical Strategy
The paper first describes the relationship between fertility preferences, regulation and out-
comes and socio-economic before the start of the CHFP project. We estimate this relation-
ship using the following regression equation:
fertilitwc = δ0 + δ1sociowc +Xwcθ + µwc (3.1)
where fertilitywc denotes fertility desires/preference, regulation or outcome of woman
w living in compound c, sociowc denotes socio-economic status, Xwc is a vector of baseline
characteristics of women and µwc is the error term. Fertility preference is measured by
desired family size; fertility regulation is measured by self-reported indicator for using modern
contraceptives; fertility outcome is measured by total number children ever born to a woman
and the number of surviving.
We investigate differential response to the CHFP project by socio-economic status by
interacting baseline socio-economic status with treatment cell assignment from the CHFP
project. The general regression equation used for these estimations is:
fertilitywct = β0 +β1treatwc +β2sociowct−1 +β3(treatwc ∗ sociowct−1) +Xwct−1σ+ εwct (3.2)
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Where sociowct−1 denotes socio-economic status measured at baseline, treatwc indicates
CHFP treatment assignment, andXwct−1 is a vector of baseline characteristics of women. The
coefficient β3, measures the differential fertility responses to CHFP treatment assignment by
socio-economic status. Because our main fertility measures – number of children ever born
and number of surviving children – are both count variables we use the Poisson model in
our estimations. In regressions not reported here, we used the negative binomial model and
the results are identical to those reported here. When the outcome variable is contraceptive
use we use logistic model in our estimations.
We use two samples for our estimations: one from the Panel survey (Panel sample)
and another sample from the surveillance data (HDSS sample). The Panel sample is used
only for estimations before the start of the CHFP project and is restricted to 3858 women
of reproductive (15-49) who were included in the original sample in 1993. The HDSS is
restricted to a sample of 24204 women in their reproductive age in 1993 and who report
all relevant variables used for the analyses. We measure children ever born and surviving
children in 1993 and 2011. We retain women who died between 1993 and 2011 in the analyses
sample in order to prevent maternal mortality from biasing our results. For such women,
current fertility outcomes are measured at the time of death. The measure of wealth used
here is a three-category wealth indicator. This is generated from the year 2000 round of
compound-level ownership of assets using the method of principal component. While a
wealth measure before the start of the CHFP (1995) would have been preferred this is not
available. However, since wealth does not change rapidly overtime, we are confident that
the 2000 wealth status is a good proxy. Our measure of education for both women and their




Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of the samples. The variables for the HDSS sample
are measured in 1993 to enable comparison of the two samples. The Panel sample is largely
representative of the HDSS with the exception of the age distribution. The HDSS sample is
almost evenly distributed across age groupings 15-24, 25-34 and 35-49 while the Panel sample
has fewer women under the age of 25 (22%) and more older women (41% aged 35-49). The
fraction of married women is identical at 81% and about 42% of women (41% in the Panel)
are in polygamous marriages. About 90% of women have at least one child but the number
of number children per woman (4.33) and number of surviving children (3.77) is slightly
higher in the Panel than in the HDSS. Majority of women (70% in the Panel and 66% in
the HDSS) practise traditional African religion with just under 30% being Christians and
under 5% being Muslims. About 76% of women (77% in the HDSS sample) have no formal
education while 86% of their husbands (85% in the HDSS sample) have no formal education.
The distribution of women across the CHFP treatment groups is comparable across the two
samples. Our measure of fertility preference (desired family size) and fertility regulation
(use of modern contraceptives) are available only in the Panel. The average woman wants a
family size of 6 people. About 11% of women report using modern contraceptives.
Table 3.2 reports differences in various characteristics of both samples by education and
wealth status. We group compounds into three categories: poorest third (poor), middle third
(middle) and richest third (rich). Panel A reports tests from the HDSS sample while Panel
B reports tests from the Panel sample. The table shows that women with some education
have significantly higher marriage rates, marry a little later, have fewer total live births and
surviving children, and are less likely to be in polygamous marriages.
Women from relatively wealthy compounds have significantly higher marriage rates,
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marry a little later, have fewer total live births and surviving children but are more likely
to be in polygamous marriages. The Panel sample (panel B) shows similar patterns qualita-
tively and quantitatively. Educated women desire fewer children and are more likely to use
modern contraceptives. Women from relatively wealthy compounds desire few children and
more likely to use modern contraceptives.
3.4.2 Fertility and socio-economic Status at Baseline
Figures 3.1-3.4 and Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the relationship between socio-economic status
and fertility preference, outcomes and regulation before the start of the CHFP project.
Figures 1 and 2 show the distributions of children per woman by education and wealth
status respectively using the HDSS sample. The top panels use children ever born while the
bottom panels use number of surviving children. The left panels shows relationships before
the start of the CHFP (1993) and the right panels show those for 2011. The relationship
between age and the number of children is estimated non-parametrically using the lowess
smoothing command in Stata. (This command has been used to estimate the relationship
between age and other variables presented in all graphs in this paper). The top left panel of
Figure 3.1 shows that in 1993, the distributions of children ever born are remarkably similar
for both educated and non-educated women up to the age of 40 years at which point the
distribution for educated women is distinctively above those with no education. The same
picture emerges when using surviving children as the measure of fertility. This is consistent
with other studies that find that educated women tend to have higher fertility rates in the
early cohorts but lower fertility in later cohorts (Jejeebhoy, 1995; Schnieder & Schneider,
1996; Kim, 2010). The bottom left panel of Figure 3.2 shows a similar relationship by wealth
status (poor, middle or rich). The distributions are almost identical. Taken together, Figures
3.1 and 3.2 show the absence of a relationship between socio-economic status and fertility
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prior to the start of the CHFP project.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 depict the relationship between fertility (preference, outcome and
regulation) and age by education and wealth status using the Panel sample in 1993. The
top panels are for children ever born (top left) and number of surviving children (top right).
The top panels of Figure 3.3 reveal nearly identical distributions among educated and non-
educated women. The top panel of Figure 3.4 also shows nearly identical distributions of
children ever born and surviving children among women of different wealth status. This
confirms the findings from the HDSS sample: there are no significant differences in fertility
outcomes between women of various socio-economic status before the start of the CHFP
project.
The bottom panels of Figures 3.3 and 3.4 depict fertility regulation (use of modern contra-
ceptives) and preference (desired family size) by education and wealth status respectively.
Although actual births are almost identical among women from various socio-economics
groups, the bottom left panels of Figures 3 and 4 show marked differences in their desired
family size. Unsurprisingly, the lower right panels show significant differences in the use of
modern contraceptive by socio-economic status.
To confirm the findings from the graphical analysis, we now use regression techniques
that allows us to control for proximate determinants of fertility which may affect the fertility-
socio-economic gradient. Moreover, the regression techniques will allow us to estimate the
additional effect of education on fertility after controlling for the effect of wealth. Table
3.3 presents results using the HDSS sample. The outcome variable in columns 1-3 present
is number of children ever born and columns 4-6 report regressions where the number of
surviving children is the outcome variable. Column 1 uses woman’s own education status
and husband’s education status as measures socio-economic status. There is no statisti-
cally significant relationship between women’s education status and the number of children.
However, there is a negative and significant (at 10% level) relationship between husband’s
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education status and the number of children. In column 2 we include an interaction be-
tween woman’s education status and her husband’s education status. The interaction term
is negative is statistically significant at 5% level but neither education coefficient alone is
significant. This implies that the effect of husband’s education status on fertility is almost
entirely driven by couples in which both women and husband are educated. In column 3,
we include our measure of wealth. The coefficients are positive and statistically significant
indicating that women from relatively richer compounds had more children. The effect of
education remains even after adding wealth, an indication that education status captures
a different aspect of socio-economic status from wealth. Columns 4-6 estimate the same
models as 1-3 using number of surviving children as outcome. Qualitatively, the results from
columns 4-6 are identical to those from columns 1-3. However, there some differences in
terms of magnitudes. The coefficients on both education and wealth and fertility are larger
when using number of surviving children, reflecting the negative socio-economic-status-child
survival gradient that is widely documented in the literature (Caldwell, 1979; Prichett &
Summers, 1996; Breierova & Duflo; 2004; Dust; 2005).
Table 3.4 presents regression results of the relationship between socio-economic status
and fertility preference, outcome and regulations using the Panel sample. The first two
columns show the relationship between socio-economic status and the number of children
ever born. As with the HDSS sample, column 1 shows that neither woman’s education status
nor her husband’s education by itself explains fertility but their interaction is negatively
associated with fertility. Column 2 shows that adding wealth status does not alter this
relationship. Unlike the HDSS sample however, wealth has no effect on fertility. Column 2
shows that these relationships remain after controlling for the effect of compound wealth.
Wealth itself has no effect on the number of children women give birth to. Columns 3-4 show
the relationship between socio-economic status and desired family size. Column 3 shows that
both a woman’s education status and her husband’s education status affect desired family
86
size but the effect of husband’s education is stronger. Column 4 shows that women from
relatively richer compounds desire smaller family sizes. Again, the addition of the wealth
effect has little effect on the size of the education coefficients. Columns 5 and 6 report log
odd-ratios from logistic regressions showing the association between socio-economic status.
Column 5 shows that both women’s and husband’s education are associated with higher odds
of using modern contraceptives but their interaction is not. Column 6 shows that women
from richer compounds have higher odds of contraceptive use.
3.4.3 Fertility Response to the CHFP by Socio-economic Status
Figure 3.5 shows distribution of children by CHFP assignment in 1993 and 2011. The left
panel of the figure shows identical distributions among women who were 30 years old or
younger. The distributions diverge after age 30, an indication that the CHFP assignments
may not have been completely random. The right panel shows the distributions in 2011.
After 18 years, the distributions diverge across all ages with much greater divergence across
among those aged 45 years and above (or 27 years and above in 1993). The right panel
shows the largest effect of the CHFP is come from the YZ and YZ+CHO treatment arms.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show how the relationship between socio-economic status and fertility
has changed in the years since the CHFP was introduced. The right panels of each figure
show the distribution of births by socio-economic status in 2011 while the left panels show
the distribution in 1993. The right panel of Figure 1 shows that by 2011 the distribution
for educated women clearly lies below that of uneducated women. This is the case for both
children ever born and surviving children. Figure 3.2 replicates this same graph using wealth
as the measure of socio-economic status. The top panel shows that there is not much change
in the number of children ever born by wealth status between 1993 and 2011. The bottom
right panel however shows a difference between surviving children by wealth status. The
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distribution of surviving children for women from richest third of compounds lies above
those for middle third and poorest third of compounds. A comparison of top right panel and
bottom right panel suggests that this difference is driven by relatively higher child survival
rates in richer compounds as found elsewhere. Taken together, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 suggest
that while there was no difference in fertility in 1993, 17 years after the start of CHFP
program educated women have fewer children. There is no such change in children ever
born by wealth status although differences in child mortality rates by wealth led to lower
surviving children by women from relatively poorer compounds.
Tables 3.5 (with results continued in Table 3.6) presents the effect of CHFP on the
association between fertility and socio-economic status using children ever born as outcome
variable. All regressions include controls for age group, marital status, indicator for being in a
polygamous marriage, religion, age at first marriage and its square. Column 1 shows that the
CHO and CHO+YZ each has significant negative effect on births but the YZ intervention
alone has no effect on births. The effect of CHO is stronger than the combined effect
of CHO+YZ. Column 1 also shows that both women’s own education and her husband’s
education now have negative and statistically significant effect on births and size of these
effects are identical. In column 2, we include an interaction between woman’s education
and husband’s education. The interaction term is negative and statistically significant, an
indication that when both couple are educated there is a stronger negative effect on births.
Moreover, adding the interaction reduces the coefficients on both women’s education status
and husband’s education status, the former becoming insignificant. This indicates that all
the negative fertility effect of women’s education is driven by couple in which both spouses
are educated. Also among uneducated women, fertility is lower when a woman is married
to educated men. Column 3 estimates a model that includes interaction between women’s
education and CHFP assignment. Adding these interaction terms does not change the size
or significance of CHO and CHO+YZ treatments. All the interaction terms are negative
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but only the interaction between women’s education status and CHO+YZ is significant at
10% level. This indicates the while CHO and CHO+YZ affected educated and uneducated
women the effect of CHO+YZ was stronger among educated women.
Column 4 adds interaction between husband’s education and CHFP treatments. Al-
though these interaction terms are negative they are not statistically significant. Inclusion
of these interactions has no effect on the other coefficients. Finally, column 5 includes wealth
and interaction between wealth and CHFP assignment. The coefficients on wealth status
are positive and statistically significant for the richest third of compounds, suggesting that
women from richest third of compounds had more births relative to those from the poor-
est third of households. The interaction terms are negative but not statistically significant.
Moreover, adding the wealth controls does not alter the effect of the education status, sug-
gesting that education has an independent effect on fertility after controlling for the effect
of health.
Table 3.7 (results continued in Table 3.8) replicates the regressions from Table 3.4 using
number of surviving children as the outcome variable. The results are consistent with those
from Tables 3.5 and 3.6 although the magnitudes of some coefficients differ somewhat. Col-
umn 1 shows that both CHO and CHO+YZ had negative and significant effect on births but
the coefficient are lower than those from Table 3.4. The coefficients on women’s education
and husband’s education are also smaller. Adding the interaction between the two educa-
tion coefficients knocks out the effect of the individual education variables. As in Tables 3.5
and 3.6, interacting the CHFP and woman’s education does not affect size or significance of
the coefficients on CHFP interventions and the interactions are negative and significant for
CHO+CHFP, an indication that the interventions affected both educated and uneducated
women but stronger effects for educated women. The size of this interaction term is larger
than that found in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, a reflection of the child mortality differentials by
woman’s education status. As in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, interaction between CHFP interven-
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tions and wealth are negative but not statistically significant. However, the coefficient on
women from the richest compound is positive and significant, and larger than that found in
the Tables 3.5 and 3.6, another confirmation of the effect of wealth on child mortality.
3.5 Summary and Conclusion
We combine longitudinal data from Kassena-Nankana District in rural northern Ghana with
quasi-experimental introduction of a reproductive health and family planning program –
the Navrongo Community Health and Family Planning Project (CHFP) – to study the
association between socio-economic status and fertility. We find that prior to the start of
the CHFP there was no statistically significant differences in fertility between educated and
non-educated women although educated women desired smaller family sizes and had higher
odds of contraceptive use. Fertility was however lower for women with educated husbands
especially when the women herself was educated. We found no differences in children ever
born by wealth but a positive relationship between surviving children and wealth, reflecting
the negative correlation between childhood mortality and wealth.
We find that placement of nurse into communities to provide family planning and ambu-
latory services reduced both the number of children ever born to a woman and the number
of surviving children but mobilization social and political institutions in support of family
planning had no effect on number of births. Combining the two interventions also resulted in
lower births. Our results hold for both educated and non-educated women but are stronger
among educated women especially when the two interventions were combined. We also find
the negative effect of husband’s education on total births and surviving children persist fol-
lowing the introduction of the CHFP but there are no statistically significant differences in
the effects of the interventions by husband’s education status. Moreover, the effect of the
interventions was not different among women from different wealth backgrounds.
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Our results suggest that introduction of reproductive health and family planning inter-
ventions had stronger impact on educated women as suggested by some previous studies
(Schultz, 1975; Kim, 2010). Our results also indicate that education has independent ef-
fect on fertility outside of any income effect. Finally, our results also suggest that in settings
with sociocultural customs and practices that lead to male dominance in reproductive health
decisions as is the case in many rural African societies, education of men may be play an
important role in fertility.
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Distribution of children by wealth status: 1993-2011
Note: All graphs are based on predicted values from non-parametric estimation of the using the lowess
command in STATA
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Fertility preferences, regulation and outcome by wealth status (1993)
Note: All graphs are based on predicted values from non-parametric estimation of the using the lowess
command in STATA
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
 
      Panel     HDSS (1993) 
 
Number of women    3858    24204 
Demographics 
15-24      22.25%   32.61% 
25-34      36.65%   33.57% 
35-49      41.10    33.82% 
 
Married     80.71%   80.62% 
Age at first marriage    18.06(2.82)   18.72(3.56) 
In polygamous marriage   41.20%   42.33% 
 
Fertility 
At least one child    89.49%   90.31% 
Children ever born    4.33(2.74)   3.978(2.13) 
Surviving children    3.77(2.45)   3.57(1.96)  
Desired family size    5.99(0.66)   - 
Currently using modern contraceptive 10.83%   - 
 
Religion 
Traditional African    69.75%   65.67% 
Christian     27.24%   29.78% 
Muslim     3.01%    4.5% 
 
Education:  
No education     76.31%   77.55% 
Some education    23.69%   22.45% 
 
Husband’s education 
No education     86.18%   85.21% 
Some education    13.82%   15.79% 
 
CHFP assignment 
Regular (control)    35.27%   36.16% 
Yezura (YZ) only     16.58%   13.95% 
CHO only     13.42%   15.98% 
CHO + YZ     34.72%   33.90% 
 
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parenthesis. HDSS sample is the universe of women in aged 15-49 years
as of 1993 whose education status do not change over the next 18 years of the study. The Panel sample is a random
sample of these women who were sampled in 1993 and interviewed annually until 2003 with the exception of 1995.  
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Table 3.2: Fertility and Proximate Determinants by socio-economic Status
 
 
PANEL A: HDSS 
   Educated   Uneducated  Diff   Poor     Middle      Rich     p-value  
 
Married  0.840       0.807           0.037***      0.782      0.803         0.821       0.000 
Age at first marriage 18.500       18.120   0.379***     18.080     18.088      18.594      0.000    
Children ever born  3.464       4.096          -0.631***     4.063       4.012        3.999        0.000 
  
Surviving children 3.189       3.681  -0.492***     3.618       3.602        3.626       0.000 
In polygamous  
marriage  0.339       0.421          -0.082***     0.296       0.431        0.455       0.000  
  
 
PANEL B: Panel 
Married  0.848     0.797  0.052***       0.744       0.796        0.838      0.000 
  
Age at first marriage 18.328     17.993  0.335***      18.263     18.100      17.904     0.000 
Children ever born 3.111     4.696 -1.584***      4.679       4.386        4.178       0.000 
Surviving children 2.771     4.073 -1.302***      4.064       3.816        3.651       0.000 
Desired family size 4.863     6.351 -1.488***      6.648       6.255        5.525       0.000 
In polygamous  
marriage  0.352     0.427 0.075***       0.278       0.419        0.451       0.000 
Using modern  
contraceptive  0.210     0.077 0.133***        0.044       0.079        0.150      0.000 
 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
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Table 3.3: socio-economic Status and Fertility at Baseline: HDSS Sample
 
Dependent variable: # of children ever born   # surviving children 




25-34         1.690***      1.690*** 1.697*** 1.721***     1.721***      1.724*** 
         (0.021)      (0.021) (0.023)  (0.022)        (0.022)      (0.023) 
35-49        2.145***      2.147*** 2.172*** 2.348***     2.213***      2.219*** 
         (0.023)     (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)       (0.024)       (0.025) 
 
Currently married  0.139***     0.125*** 0.124*** 0.124***     0.124***      0.124*** 
         (0.012)     (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)        (0.012)      (0.013)  
In polygamous 
marriage       -0.087***     -0.089*** -0.099***       -0.101***     -0.099***    -0.111*** 
        (0.008)     (0.008)  (0.009) (0.008)         (0.009)      (0.009) 
Marriage age       -0.029***     -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.028***    -0.032***    -0.034*** 
        (0.006)     (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)        (0.007)         (0.006) 
Marriage age  
squared      -0.000**    -0.000*** -0.000***       -0.000***     -0.000**      -0.000** 
        (0.000)     (0.000)         (0.000)           (0.000)         (0.000)       (0.000) 
Woman is 
   educated       0.002     0.024 0.019    0.000          0.023            0.021 
       (0.012)    (0.018) (0.019) (0.012)         (0.019)         (0.019) 
Husband is 
 educated      -0.019*    -0.006 -0.013  -0.026**       0.009          -0.010 
       (0.011)    (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)         (0.014)         (0.010) 
 
Couple 
are educated        -0.083***   -0.079**           -0.078**       -0.072* 
     (0.031)  (0.031)            (0.031)         (0.031) 
Wealth quintile 
 Poor (ref) 
 Middle                0.030***                                 0.043*** 
      (0.013)                      (0.012) 
 Rich     0.051***                      0.072*** 
      (0.011)           (0.012) 
 
N     24204             24204   23924  24204  24204        23924 
Pseudo R2    0.2696   0.2697 0.2708   0.2744 0.2650        0.2662 
Wald Statistic 11962.84  12062.60        11313.59 12237.66         11961.57    11182.97 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at compound level are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote p<0.10, 
p<0.005 and p<0.001 respectively. All regressions are estimated using Poisson models. All regressions include 
control for religion and ethnicity of the woman. 
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Table 3.4: socio-economic Status and Fertility at Baseline: Panel Sample
 
Dependent variable:  Total children ever born Desired No of children        Using modern contraceptive 




25-34        0.946***       0.954*** 0.113***        0.108***  1.956***        1.953*** 
         (0.043)   (0.042) (0.033)           (0.032)  (0.384)           (0.387) 
35-49        1.455***       1.457*** 0.268***        0.262***  1.941***        1.940*** 
        (0.042)   (0.041) (0.033)           (0.032)  (0.372)           (0.368) 
 
Currently married    0.008    0.012  -0.055           -0.051  0.769            0.693 
        (0.035)   (0.034) (0.048)           (0.045)  (0.220)            (0.194) 
In polygamous 
marriage       -0.051***     -0.052*** -0.024            -0.016  0.976            0.915 
        (0.016)   (0.016) (0.020)            (0.020)  (0.126)            (0.120) 
Marriage age           -0.033*   0.016  -0.037**          -0.037**  0.986               0.973 
        (0.019)   (0.019) (0.018)            (0.018)  (0.109)            (0.111) 
Marriage age  
squared       -0.002***      -0.001** 0.001**           0.001*  1.000               1.000  
       (0.000)          (0.000)  (0.000)            (0.000)  (0.002)           (0.003)    
 
Women is  
educated     -0.019   -0.015  -0.102***        -0.104*** 2.425***         2.172*** 
      (0.021)   (0.022) (0.029)             (0.029)  (0.331)            (0.360) 
Husband is  
educated     -0.003             -0.005  -0.149***        -0.136*** 2.141***         1.871*** 
      (0.022)            (0.025) (0.030)  (0.030)  (0.436)              (0.389) 
 
Couple  
are educated     -0.050*   -0.057* 0.014  0.025  0.968            1.081 
       (0.029)            (0.030)            (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.261)            (0.304) 
Wealth quintile 
 Poor (ref)           
 Middle          -0.013   -0.001              1.414 
           (0.023)   (0.032)               (0.365) 
 Rich          0.006   -0.107***             2.504*** 
           (0.022)   (0.031)               (0.610) 
 
Observations (N) 2548        2448 2080  1880  2552             2452 
Pseudo R2  0.1548        0.1557 0.0337  0.0372  0.1104             0.1221 
Wald Statistic  2334.13       2445.16 318.04  308.37  199.14             231.89 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at compound level are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote p<0.10, 
p<0.005 and p<0.001 respectively. Columns 1-4 reports results from Poisson regression models. Columns 5-6 
reports regressions from logistic regressions. All regressions include controls for religion and ethnicity of the 
woman. 
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Table 3.5: Effect of CHFP on Children Ever Born
 
Dependent variable:    Number of children ever born   
(1)     (2)  (3)  (4)          (5) 
 
CHFP treatment 
 YZ   -0.019  -0.014  -0.015           -0.012         0.016 
    (0.022) (0.020) (0.021)          (0.021)         (0.031) 
 CHO   -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.054***     -0.054***      -0.078*** 
    (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)          (0.014)         (0.028) 
 YZ+CHO  -0.041*** -0.039*** -0.034***     -0.033***      -0.023 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)          (0.011)         (0.022)  
Woman is educated  -0.057*** -0.010   0.015           0.012          0.014 
    (0.011) (0.010) (0.019)          (0.023)          (0.023) 
Husband is educated   -0.057*** -0.030*** -0.031***      -0.028*          0.032*** 
      (0.011) (0.011)           (0.017)          (0.011) 
 
Couple are educated    -0.127*** -0.125***      -0.123***     -0.125*** 
       (0.020) (0.020)           (0.020)          (0.020) 
CHO * woman is educated     -0.014            -0.008         -0.008 
        (0.032)            (0.031)         (0.032) 
YZ * woman is educated     -0.013            -0.008          -0.014 
        (0.039) (0.038)         (0.039) 
YZ+CHO * woman is educated    -0.049*           -0.045*         -0.045* 
        (0.028) (0.026)          (0.026) 
CHO * husband is educated       -0.018   
          (0.031) 
YZ * husband is educated       -0.001 
          (0.025) 
YZ+CHO * husband is educated      -0.013 
          (0.024) 
Wealth quintile 
 Poor (ref)   
 Middle                     0.009 
                      (0.014) 
 Rich                     0.024* 
                      (0.013) 
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Table 3.6: Effect of CHFP on Children Ever Born (Table 3.5 continued)
 
Dependent variable:    Number of children ever born   
(1)     (2)  (3)  (4)          (5) 
 
 
Middle*YZ                     -0.025 
                      (0.035) 
Middle * CHO                    0.028 
                      (0.035) 
Middle* CHO+YZ                   -0.011 
                      (0.027) 
Rich*YZ                    -0.042 
                      (0.031) 
Rich* CHO                     0.016 
                     (0.032) 
Rich* CHO+YZ                   -0.022  
                     (0.024)  
 
Observations (N)  24204  24204  24204  24204            23924 
Pseudo R2   0.0502  0.0505  0.0502  0.0505            0.0503 
Wald Statistic   3196.31 3202.09 3224.89 3238.54          3239.68 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at compound level are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote p<0.10, 
p<0.005 and p<0.001 respectively. All regressions estimated using poisson models. All regressions include controls 
for age group, marital status, indicator for being in a polygamous marriage, religion, age at first marriage and its 
square.
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Table 3.7: Effect of CHFP on Surviving Children
 
Dependent variable:    Number of surviving children   
(1)     (2)  (3)  (4)           (5) 
 
CHFP treatment 
 YZ   -0.008  -0.009  -0.008          -0.005         0.007 
    (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)         (0.018)         (0.029) 
 CHO   -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.048***    -0.051***       -0.081*** 
    (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)         (0.014)         (0.026) 
 YZ+CHO  -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.025***    -0.024**         -0.021 
    (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)        (0.011)         (0.022)  
Woman is educated  -0.038***  0.011   0.054**       0.052**         0.051** 
    (0.011) (0.013) (0.023)        (0.023)         (0.023) 
Husband is educated   -0.037*** -0.007  -0.008         -0.005         -0.012 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)        (0.018)         (0.011) 
Both woman and husband 
are educated     -0.129*** -0.126***   -0.123***        -0.125*** 
       (0.020) (0.020)        (0.021)         (0.021) 
CHO * woman is educated     -0.037         -0.031         -0.029 
        (0.030)        (0.031)         (0.031) 
YZ * woman is educated     -0.025         -0.029         -0.027 
        (0.037)        (0.038)         (0.037) 
YZ+CHO * woman is educated    -0.073***   -0.071***        -0.069*** 
        (0.028)        (0.027)         (0.028) 
CHO * husband is educated              -0.018   
                  (0.033) 
YZ * husband is educated               0.020 
                  (0.034) 
YZ+CHO * husband is educated              -0.008 
                  (0.024) 
Wealth quintile 
 Poor (ref)   
 Middle                  0.010 
                   (0.014) 
 Rich                  0.039*** 
                   (0.013) 
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Table 3.8: Effect of CHFP on Surviving Children (Table 3.6 continued)
 
Dependent variable:    Number of surviving children   
(1)     (2)  (3)  (4)           (5) 
 
 
Middle*YZ                  -0.012 
                   (0.034) 
Middle * CHO                 0.045 
                   (0.034) 
Middle* CHO+YZ                 -0.001 
                   (0.027) 
Rich*YZ                  -0.032 
                   (0.034) 
Rich* CHO                   0.019 
                   (0.030) 
Rich* CHO+YZ                 -0.019 
                   (0.024) 
 
N    24204  24204  24204           24204         23924 
Pseudo R2   0.0487  0.0490  0.0491           0.0505         0.0490 
Wald Statistic   3210.52 3217.03           3231.11         3245.07         3232.50 
 
Robust standard errors clustered at compound level are reported in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote p<0.10, 
p<0.005 and p<0.001 respectively. All regressions estimated using Poisson models. All regressions include controls 
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Getting the Poor to Enroll in Health
Insurance and Its Effect on Their





PANEL A: attrition rate  
 
                All  p-value 
Full       control    treatments     test   
 
Percent of baseline sample  6.48%       7.62%     6.82%                0.3351 
 
      % of individuals not re-interviewed 
Panel B: reasons for attrition   
Deceased       7.65%  
Relocated outside district     26.23%  
Travelled       57.92% 
Other        8.20% 
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Table A.2: Effect of Interventions on enrollment (with subsidy levels)
 
Outcome variable: indicator = 0 for not enrolled, 1 for enrolled 
 (1)  (2)          (3)     (4)  (5)                 (6) 
 
1/3 Subsidy   0.287***        0.287***        0.271***     0.270***       0.293***       0.235***   
   (0.114)           (0.077)        (0.075)     (0.082)          (0.089)          (0.091)  
2/3 subsidy  0.357***        0.308***        0.322***     0.332***       0.326***       0.343***  
   (0.067)           (0.070)        (0.070)     (0.072) (0.104)          (0.096) 
Full subsidy  0.473***        0.443***        0.435***     0.405***       0.473***       0.386*** 
   (0.086)           (0.082)        (0.080)     (0.083)          (0.094)          (0.066) 
Education   0.213**          0.186**         0.176*     0.175**         0.246**         0.098 
   (0.103)           (0.090)        (0.092)     (0.089)          (0.108)           (0.108) 
Conve regist.  0.046            0.039        0.035     0.023             -0.022           0.054  
   (0.082)            (0.062)        (0.048)           (0.048)           (0.060)           (0.082)  
1/3 subsidy& conve. 0.287**          0.231***        0.186**     0.223***       0.185***        0.139 
   (0.115)            (0.086)        (0.074)     (0.064)          (0.039)           (0.104) 
1/3 subsidy& educ 0.398***         0.301***       0.316***     0.322***       0.449***        0.223* 
   (0.124)            (0.074)        (0.078)           (0.074)           (0.097)           (0.087) 
2/3 subsidy & conve. 0.478**           0.432***       0.371***     0.362***       0.355***        0.368***  
   (0.070)            (0.059)        (0.054)          (0.056)            (0.064)            (0.069)  
2/3 subsidy & educ 0.489***         0.454***       0.454***     0.455***        0.475***        0.419*** 
   (0.053)            (0.063)        (0.058)           (0.064)           (0.064)            (0.083) 
Full subsidy & conve. 0.475***         0.369***        0.421***     0.445***        0.490***        0.390*** 
   (0.096)            (0.058)        (0.059)           (0.056)            (0.065)           (0.063) 
Full subsidy & educ 0.637***         0.554***        0.568***     0.578***        0.603***        0.534*** 
   (0.044)            (0.048)        (0.049)    (0.049)   (0.058)          (0.066) 
  
Individual controls     N              Y           Y                     Y                  Y              Y 
Household controls     N              N           Y         Y                  Y              Y 
Community controls      N              N                     N                     Y                  Y               Y 
           
N   4298  4298          4298        4298             1995              2283 
F-statistic  26.38  24.67          28.83        30.39             26.00              25.29 
R2   0.1778  0.2557          0.2811        0.2822     0.2426            0.2640 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 10 and 1% levels respectively. F-statistic is for excluded instruments (interventions). Individual 
covariates are: age group (<18 years, 18-69, and 70+), gender, education status, indicator for having ever registered 
with the NHIS at baseline, and indicator having visited a health facility at baseline. Household covariates are: 
household size, religion, ethnicity and wealth index (poor third, middle third and rich third). Community covariates 
are: distance to nearest health facility, distance to NHIS registration center. Columns (5) and (6) restricts sample to 
adults aged 18 and above and children under 18 respectively. 
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Table A.3: Heterogeneous response to interventions by wealth status
 
Outcome variable: indicator = 0 for not enrolled, 1 for enrolled 
  (1)    (2)  
 
Education    0.150**     
     (0.078) 
Subsidy     0.336***  
     (0.060) 
Conve regist    0.053 
     (0.076) 
Educ. &conve reg   0.156* 
     (0.086) 
Subsidy & conve reg.   0.348*** 
     (0.079) 
Subsidy & educ.    0.488*** 
     (0.085) 
Subsidy & educ & conve   0.462*** 
     (0.079)  
Poorest third    -0.131** 
     (0.053) 
Poorest third * educ     0.030        
      (0.069)           
Poorest third* subsidy     0.105         
      (0.088)            
Poorest third * conve    -0.067          
      (0.061)          
Poorest third * educ & conve   -0.029            
      (0.104)        
Poorest third*subsidy & conve   0.113    
      (0.093)          
Poorest third*subsidy & educ    0.277***          
      (0.074)             
Poorest third*subsidy & educ & conve  0.253***         
      (0.071) 
1/3 subsidy        0.202*** 
         (0.071) 
2/3 subsidy        0.320*** 
         (0.074) 
Full subsidy        0.418*** 
         (0.053) 
Poorest third        -0.132*** 
         (0.033) 
Poorest third *1/3 subsidy       0.355*** 
         (0.104) 
Poorest third*2/3 subsidy       0.132* 
         (0.078) 
Poorest third*full subsidy                    -0.028 
                 (0.091) 
 
N      4298    2022  
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include full set of covariates (individual, household, community). 
Regressions in columns (3) and (4) are restricted to the pure control group and households receiving subsidy only. 
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Table A.4: Heterogeneous response to interventions by education status
 
Outcome variable: indicator = 0 for not enrolled, 1 for enrolled 
     (1)   (2)  
 
Education    0.152** 
     (0.068) 
Subsidy     0.315*** 
     (0.056) 
Conve regist    -0.021 
     (0.061) 
Educ. &conve reg   0.190* 
     (0.105) 
Subsidy & conve reg.   0.336*** 
     (0.073) 
Subsidy & educ.    0.472*** 
     (0.084) 
Subsidy & educ & conve   0.430*** 
     (0.075) 
HH educated * educ    0.036         
     (0.053)            
HH educated * subsidy     0.144**         
     (0.058)           
HH educated * conve     0.057           
     (0.048)            
HH educated * educ & conve   -0.023            
     (0.103)         
HH educated *subsidy & conve  0.107    
     (0.071)           
HH educated *subsidy & educ   0.155**          
     (0.068)              
HH educated *subsidy & educ & conve 0.180***            
     (0.073)         
HH educated    -0.019    0.011 
     (0.039)    (0.027)  
1/3 subsidy        0.215*** 
         (0.079) 
2/3 subsidy        0.324*** 
         (0.065) 
Full subsidy        0.390*** 
         (0.053) 
HH educated *1/3 subsidy       0.056 
         (0.088) 
HH educated *2/3 subsidy       0.088** 
         (0.040) 
HH educated* Full subsidy       0.089* 
                 (0.048) 
 
N     4298    2022 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include full set of covariates (individual,
household, community). Regressions in columns (3) and (4) are restricted to the pure control group and households 
receiving subsidy only. 
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Table A.5: Heterogeneous response to interventions by health condition
 
Dependent variable: indicator = 0 for not enrolled, 1 for enrolled 
      (1)   (2)  
 
Education     0.144** 
      (0.072) 
Subsidy      0.357*** 
      (0.052) 
Conve regist     -0.004 
      (0.065) 
Educ. &conve reg    0.196** 
      (0.098) 
Subsidy & conve reg.    0.354*** 
      (0.077) 
Subsidy & educ.     0.420*** 
      (0.078) 
Subsidy & educ & conve    0.448*** 
      (0.064) 
Chronic condition * educ      0.156***      
       (0.038)         
Chronic condition * subsidy    0.047           
       (0.087)           
Chronic condition * conve     0.037             
       (0.105)          
Chronic condition * educ & conve    -0.044             
       (0.107)        
Chronic condition *subsidy & conve  0.066      
      (0.080)           
Chronic condition *subsidy & educ    0.105*          
      (0.062)             
Chronic condition *subsidy & educ & conve  0.163*** 
            (0.047) 
Chronic condition    -0.056*   -0.019 
      (0.033)   (0.036) 
1/3 subsidy        0.243*** 
         (0.071) 
2/3 subsidy        0.344*** 
         (0.066) 
Full subsidy        0.417*** 
         (0.043) 
Chronic condition *1/3 subsidy      -0.004 
         (0.103) 
Chronic condition *2/3 subsidy      -0.016 
         (0.066) 
Chronic condition * Full subsidy       0.058 
                 (0.068) 
 
N              4298   2022  
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include full set of covariates (individual, 
household, community). Regressions in columns (3) and (4) are restricted to the pure control group and households 
receiving subsidy only. 
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Table A.6: Heterogeneous response to interventions by “unmet need” for health care
 
Dependent variable: indicator = 0 for not enrolled, 1 for enrolled 
      (1)   (2)  
 
Education     0.141* 
      (0.077) 
Subsidy      0.339*** 
      (0.049) 
Conve regist      0.001 
      (0.062) 
Educ. &conve reg    0.209 
      (0.148) 
Subsidy & conve reg.    0.349*** 
      (0.074) 
Subsidy & educ.     0.524*** 
      (0.077) 
Subsidy & educ & conve    0.443*** 
      (0.065) 
Unmet need * educ      0.172**   
       (0.067)         
Unmet need * subsidy     0.027           
       (0.079)         
Unmet need * conve      0.016             
       (0.105)         
Unmet need * educ & conve     0.006             
       (0.163)        
Unmet need *subsidy & conve    0.016      
       (0.175)           
Unmet need *subsidy & educ     0.226**          
      (0.101)          
Unmet need *subsidy & educ & conve  0.255*** 
            (0.061) 
Unmet need for health facility   -0.077   -0.083 
      (0.054)   (0.041) 
1/3 subsidy        0.343*** 
         (0.075) 
2/3 subsidy        0.457*** 
         (0.056) 
Full subsidy        0.481*** 
         (0.060) 
Unmet need *1/3 subsidy       0.192** 
         (0.085) 
Unmet need *2/3 subsidy        0.093 
         (0.202) 
Unmet need * Full subsidy       0.016 
                 (0.096) 
 
N              4298   2022  
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All regressions include full set of controls (individual, household, community). An 
individual is defined to have unmet need for health care if he/she reports a chronic condition lasting for more than 6 months but 
do not seek regular treatment for the condition.
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Table A.7: Effect on utilization of health care services by age (IV)
 
Dep. variable:            Visited health facility            Visited health facility            # of facility visits   visited health facility for 
                       in the last 4 weeks                   in last 6 months             in last 6 months    malaria treatment 
          (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)      (6)   (7)  (8) 
 
          
Insured       0.121** 0.139** 0.126** 0.155*** 0.239*       0.350***  0.017  0.053*** 
       (0.060) (0.057)  (0.063)  (0.060)  (0.139)       (0.138)  (0.022)  (0.017) 
 
Control mean      0.120 0.113  0.106  0.098  0.210       0.197  0.019  0.017 
   
N       1995 2303  1995  2303  1995       2303  1995  2303 
R2       0.0614 0.0975  0.0618  0.0768  0.0424        0.0560  0.0146  0.0195 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at community level are reported in brackets. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. All regressions include controls for both individual-level and household/community-level variables. Individual-level controls are: age-group (<18 
and 70+, 18-69 is omitted), gender, indicator for having a health condition, indicator for visiting a health facility at baseline, education status. 
Household/community-level controls are: household wealth (poorest third and richest third, middle third omitted), household size, religion, ethnicity, distance to 
nearest health facility and distance to NHIS registration point. Sample regressions in (1), (3), (5) and (7) restricted to adult sample (18+) while regressions in (2), 
(4), (6) and (8) are restricted children (<18 years).
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Table A.8: Included and excluded services: NHIS minimum coverage
Included Services Exclusion List 
1. Out-Patient Services 
       i) General and specialized consultation and review 
       ii) Requested investigations (including laboratory     
          investigations, x-rays and ultrasound scanning) 
      iii) Medication (prescription drugs on the NHIS Drug List) 
      iv) HIV/AIDS symptomatic treatment for opportunistic  
           infection    
      v) Out-patient/Day Surgery Operations including hernia  
           repairs, incision and drainage, hemorrhoidectomy  
      vi) Out-patient physiotherapy 
 
2. In-Patient Services 
       i) General and specialist in-patient care 
       ii) Requested investigations 
       iii) Medication (prescription drugs on the NHIS Drug List) 
       iv) Cervical and Breast Cancer Treatment 
       v) Surgical Operations 
       vi) In-patient physiotherapy 
       vii) Accommodation in general ward 
       viii) Feeding (where available) 
 
3. Oral Health Services 
      i) Pain relief which includes incision and drainage, tooth  
         extraction and temporary relief 
      ii) Dental restoration which includes simple amalgam 
           fillings and temporary dressing 
 
4. Eye Care Services 
       i) Refraction, visual fields and A-Scan 
       ii) Keratometry 
       iii) Cataract Removal 
       iv) Eye lid surgery 
 
5. Maternity Care 
        i) Antenatal care 
        ii) Deliveries (normal and assisted) 
        iii) Caesarian section 
        iv) Postnatal care 
 
6. Emergencies 
         i) Medical emergencies 
         ii) Surgical emergencies including brain surgery due to 
         accidents 
         iii) Pediatric emergencies 
         iv) Obstetric and gynecological emergencies  
         v) Road traffic accidents 
         vi) Industrial and workplace accidents 
         vii) Dialysis for acute renal failure    
1. Rehabilitation other than 
physiotherapy 
 
2. Appliances and protheses including 
optical aids, hearing aids, orthopedic 
aids and dentures 
 
3. Cosmetic surgeries and aesthetic 
treatment 
 
4. HIV retroviral drugs 
 
5. Assisted reproduction eg artificial 
insemination and gynecological 










10. Dialysis for chronic renal failure 
 
11. Heart and brain surgery other than 
those resulting from accidents 
 
12. Cancer treatment other than 
cervical ad breast cancer 
 
13. Organ transplanting 
 
14. All drugs that not listed on the 
NHIS Drug List 
 
15. Diagnosis and treatment abroad 
 
16. Medical examinations for purposes 
of visa applications, education and 
institutional driving license 
 
17. VIP ward accommodation 
 
18. Mortuary services  
 
Source: NHIA (2011) 

